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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he functioning of the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been a highly 
controversial topic since its establishment over two years ago. Emerging from 
nearly a decade of delays and ‘turf wars’, the EEAS had to quickly construct a 
relationship with the diplomatic services of the EU member states, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament as well as transform the Commission’s 
Delegations into Union Delegations. Inter-institutional linkages have not always 
functioned smoothly and tensions have run high at times. Insiders but especially 
outsiders have often struggled to understand how the new EU foreign policy 
machinery functions. In the midst of forming its own distinctive identity among the EU 
institutions and vis-à-vis the EU member states, the EEAS is facing major review this 
year and a revision of its mandate in 2014.  
This CEPS study examines two interrelated topics: 1) the way in which the EEAS has 
functioned in the EU institutional architecture in its first two years of existence and 2) 
the improvements that could be made through the 2013 review and the 2014 revision of 
its mandate. This study contributes to the current debate through an in-depth analysis 
of the EEAS’ relations with the EU member states, the European Commission, the 
European Parliament and its delegations.  
The EEAS’ relations with the member states focus primarily on the Council of the 
European Union (Council), the European Council and the rotating Presidency of the 
Council. In order to be successful, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
requires an enhanced sense of ownership of the member states, which have to accept 
the new structures, feel represented by the different policy choices as well as be 
convinced that the EEAS provides added value. The permanent chairing by the High 
Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) and the EEAS of the meetings of the foreign 
ministers and their preparatory working groups increases the continuity as well as the 
T
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cohesiveness of the work of the Council in this area. However, this comes at the 
expense of a certain ‘drive’ of EU foreign policy that the rotating Presidency ensured in 
the old system. Measures that lead to a better setting of priorities and management of 
the agenda can help in overcoming this problem.  
The Lisbon Treaty strengthened the role of the European Council as a foreign policy 
forum once again. In the new system, the foreign ministers no longer participate in the 
European Council. This change, combined with the fact that neither the Foreign Affairs 
Council nor the High Representative is a formal part of the preparatory process of the 
European Council, had the effect of disconnecting the Heads of State or Government 
from the foreign policy administrations. The High Representative and the EEAS are 
well positioned to improve the European Council and the Council link through 
multiple avenues. 
The rotating Council Presidency still chairs some of the working parties and Council 
formations with external action portfolios. Presidency priorities usually touch on 
external action issues and its foreign ministers even sometimes represent the EU 
internationally or in relation to the European Parliament. 
The relations between the Commission and the EEAS reveal some of the most 
problematic issues raised by the creation of this new body. The Commission ensures 
the EU’s external representation with the exception of the CFSP but, at the same time, it 
is the High Representative with the help of the EEAS that has to ensure the 
coordination and consistency of all aspects of the external action of the Union. The 
creation of the EEAS outside the Commission structures did not pass without incident. 
The Commission defended its portfolios, with some Commission officials fearing that 
the creation of the EEAS could lead to a politicisation of their work. In order to clarify 
inter-institutional relations between the two bodies, several working arrangement and 
vademecums were written, although not always with the proper consultation of the 
parties involved. The 2013 review could be a good opportunity to see what works, 
what does not work and what can be improved. 
Cooperation between the EEAS and the Directorate-General (DG) for Development of 
the Commission has been mixed. The Union’s external cooperation programmes 
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remains under the responsibility of the Commission, but the EEAS contributes to 
several steps of the programming cycle. This requires an increased effort to ensure 
better coordination between the Commission services and the EEAS. This also applies 
to the field of Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection where both the Commission and 
the EEAS have responsibilities. 
The creation of the post of HR/VP and the EEAS has not dramatically affected the EU's 
trade policy-making structure, with the classic relationship between the former 
External Relations and Trade parts of the European Commission, characterised by both 
cooperation and rivalry, being largely transposed in the new institutional set-up. In the 
candidate and potential candidate countries, the enlargement process is the prime 
mover of EU policy and this seems to be respected by the EEAS. However, some 
candidate or potential candidate countries still pose serious political challenges to the 
EU that require the involvement of the High Representative and the EEAS.  
The collaboration of the EEAS and the Commission in the area of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is highly complex and follows a distinct logic. So far, it 
has functioned relatively well. As opposed to policy areas such as trade, development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid, there is no specialised DG for neighbourhood 
policy in the Commission and the ENP Commissioner relies on the support of the 
EEAS. The current structure could serve as a model for a system in which one of the 
Commissioners could serve as a deputy to the HR/VP, at least concerning her work 
inside the Commission.  
In the EEAS’ relations with the European Parliament, MEPs from the main political 
groups of the Parliament are in general satisfied with its set-up and performance. By 
merging the tasks of the High Representative, the External Relations Commissioner 
and the rotating Presidency, the HR/VP is left as one of the main interlocutors for the 
European Parliament. Given the workload of the HR/VP, it is important to find an 
efficient system of deputisation in the European Parliament. Rather than relying on the 
rotating Presidency, the European Parliament should use the opportunity to have the 
EEAS as a permanent interlocutor. The High Representative can use her six 
appearances per year to gather support for her positions and as a public stage on 
which to present and promote them. 
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The new EU delegations are the backbone of EU representation around the world, but 
they would remain toothless if they wouldn’t be able to properly cooperate with the 
member states’ 3,000 missions and the European Commission. The more political role 
of the EU delegations enables them to represent EU statements and démarches and to 
chair EU internal coordination meetings with the member states’ embassies. While 
bilateral representation in most of the third countries is in general acknowledged as 
successful, representation of the EU in multilateral organisations faces more challenges. 
Some member states see the enhanced status of an EU delegation in international 
organisations as problematic. Information-sharing and effective coordination with the 
member states and the Commission DGs remain a challenge, which could be overcome 
in the long-term with the necessary political will and gradual cooperation. 
Policy Recommendations 
Specific recommendations can be found throughout this CEPS book. They can best be 
summarised by the three following roles that should guide the EEAS’ relations with its 
EU partners – the member states, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament – both in Brussels and on the ground around the world. 
• Leader 
The High Representative and the EEAS in many cases took over the role of the 
rotating Presidency – in the Council as well as on the ground in third countries 
and international organisations. One of the core political functions of the foreign 
policy administration in this regard is to provide leadership. A better setting of 
priorities and management of the foreign policy agenda is of key importance. To 
this end, an inclusive approach that highlights close cooperation with its EU 
partners has to be reflected in the working procedures. Member states, the 
European Commission and the European Parliament have to feel represented by 
the priorities of the EEAS. 
• Coordinator 
A major task of the EEAS and the High Representative is to ensure the overall 
coordination of EU external action. The division of responsibilities between the 
Commission and the EEAS should be clarified in some areas and working 
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arrangements between the two bodies should be streamlined. Besides multilevel 
coordination at the level of the services, the role of the High Representative as 
Vice-President of the Commission has to be strengthened in order to allow the 
incumbent to ensure the coherence of the EU’s international activities across 
policy areas. Establishing a system of deputies for the High Representative can 
also facilitate better coordination with its partners. 
• Information hub 
The EEAS is a service to its EU partners. As such, it has to provide visible added 
value for them.  The EEAS can show its strength by being the ‘one-stop shop’ for 
foreign policy expertise. Information-sharing and close cooperation are 
important factors in establishing a coherent international profile of the EU. 
Providing support and briefings for the European Commission, European 
Parliament, European Council President, the rotating Presidency as well as the 
member states are important tasks of the EEAS in this regard. Appropriate 
funding and working procedures enable the service to gather and deliver the 
necessary information. Information-sharing should be reciprocal. As a 
consequence, the EEAS can also strengthen its position as a valuable and reliable 
interlocutor in the international community. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
he European External Action Service (EEAS) and its head, the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Vice-
President of the European Commission (HR/VP), are the central innovations brought 
about with the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon. Although the post-Lisbon changes 
include, inter alia, the modification of the composition of the European Council, the 
revision of the formations of the Council of the European Union (Council) and the 
creation of the post of the President of the European Council, it is the EEAS and the 
HR/VP that were expected to significantly improve the EU’s profile in the world. 
The EEAS is an unprecedented actor within the already highly sophisticated 
institutional structure of the EU. It is not a supranational institution similar to the 
European Commission (Commission) or the European Parliament. Nor is it 
intergovernmental in nature like the Council. The EEAS has to navigate between the 
‘community’ and the intergovernmental decision-making methods with the mission to 
support the EU member states, while maintaining complex relations with the 
Commission and the European Parliament. This report examines two interrelated 
questions: 1) How has the EEAS functioned within the EU institutional architecture in 
the first two years of its existence? 2) What improvements could be made through the 
2013 review and the 2014 revision of the EEAS’ mandate?  
Methodologically, the report combines qualitative and quantitative methods drawing 
on data and information obtained from multiple sources. Firstly, the report examines 
primary documents such as legal texts, official documents, statements and press 
releases. Secondly, the study analyses the observations and insights shared in the 
course of extensive interviews with officials of the EEAS, the member states’ 
Permanent Representations to the EU, the Commission’s staff and Members of the 
European Parliament involved in the establishment and workings of the EEAS. The 
T
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interviews, which were conducted over the period May 2011 to December 2012, were 
granted on the condition of anonymity. And finally, the report makes critical use of 
secondary academic and policy-oriented literature. 
The EU needed about eight years to agree on the set-up of the EEAS starting from the 
European Convention in 2002 until the Council decision establishing the Service in 
2010. Throughout this period, the ‘EU’s foreign office’ project was intensively debated 
by all the major EU players, namely the member states, the Commission and the 
European Parliament in the framework of the Constitutional Convention (2002), two 
Intergovernmental Conferences (2003-04 and 2007) and the ‘quadrilogue’ meetings 
(that debated the final basic structure of the service).  
The EEAS emerged as the result of a classic EU compromise yet with an unusual 
outcome. Most member states felt the need for a more continuous and coordinated EU 
foreign policy. While some of the member states advocated a more integrated external 
action of the EU, others were hesitant to fully integrate all external activities, especially 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) within the Commission. The Commission aimed to protect its ‘turf’ and 
the European Parliament aimed to increase its competences. Consequently, the EEAS 
has a long job description. It is supposed to fulfil functions of a Presidency, diplomatic 
service, ministry of development and defence, as well as coordinating overall 
coherence of external action. Another example of its kind is hard to find in the 
international system.  
At the institutional level, the EEAS supports the HR/VP in her different capacities as 
the High Representative, President of the Foreign Affairs Council, Vice-President of the 
Commission and coordinator of the other aspects of the Union’s external action. The 
EEAS also assists the President of the European Council and the President of the 
Commission and supports the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy. 
Furthermore, the EEAS cooperates with and supports the member states’ diplomatic 
services, the Council Secretariat, the services of the Commission, the European 
Parliament and the Union’s other relevant institutions, bodies and agencies. 
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By bridging the Council-Commission divide and linking all the major actors and 
policies of the EU external action, the EEAS was expected to achieve what no other 
entity in the EU’s history had managed to deliver: a consistent and efficient external 
action of the Union. Not an easy task, considering the multiplicity of actors with their 
formal and informal competences, varying interests, diverging preferences and distinct 
decision-making procedures. Therefore, the initial enthusiasm for the quick fix of the 
EU’s external action problems through the establishment of the EEAS faded rapidly.  
The unusual outcome of the compromise between the EU member states and the 
institutions is also inherent in the EEAS’ composition. The EEAS comprises staff from 
the Commission, the Council Secretariat and the national diplomatic services of the 
member states within its headquarters and EU delegations to third countries and 
international organisations. These different categories of staff bring their distinct 
socialisation, training and working methods to the new service. The former 
Commission staff is familiar with the more hierarchical and technical work of the 
Commission. Those coming from the Council Secretariat are familiar with the 
sensitivities and political nature of the work within the Council. Finally, the member 
states’ diplomats bring a fresh national perspective from the capitals. In theory, the 
merger was supposed to strengthen the ties between the main actors of the EU’s 
external action. In reality, however, the cultivation of an esprit de corps within the EEAS 
remains a challenge.  
In addition to persistent and diverging internal interests among the member states and 
the institutions, the setting up post-2009 European foreign policy architecture did not 
have much luck with the timing of international developments either. While these 
developments provided ‘windows of opportunity’ for the new service to prove its 
added value, they arrived at a stage when the EEAS was not yet fully prepared. The 
findings of this report point to mixed results delivered by the EEAS.  
In the following four chapters we examine the changes and new roles of the 
institutions working in the EU’s foreign affairs. We look at how the EEAS has been 
cooperating with the member states and institutions. First, we analyse the EEAS’ 
relations with the European Council, the Council and the member states in general. 
This partnership remains ambiguous; among many issues still pending to be addressed 
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properly is how to make most of the permanent chairmanship of the High 
Representative and the EEAS, while giving fresh impetus to new foreign policy 
initiatives. Second, we look at the complex relationship of the EEAS and the European 
Commission. The EEAS cooperates with some of the Directorates-General (DGs) of the 
Commission better than with others. In some policy issues, the EEAS and the 
Commission managed easily to find a consensus, whereas in other areas, the 
relationship was mired in disagreements. Third, we examine the new relationship of 
the EEAS with the European Parliament, where issues of political accountability have 
been at times confused with micro-management. The quest for democratic 
accountability for the EU’s foreign policy – if it was to be provided by the Parliament – 
has been largely a disappointment for the legislature, even if some important steps 
have been taken. Fourth, the study examines the coordination and cooperation of EU 
delegations. While experiencing numerous difficulties, EU delegations are gradually 
taking over the external representation and internal coordination role from the rotating 
Council Presidency in third countries and various multilateral fora. Information-
sharing and effective coordination with the member states and the Commission DGs 
remain a challenge.  
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2. COOPERATION WITH THE MEMBER STATES – 
THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL AND 
BEYOND 
he creation of the EEAS and the HR/VP can be seen as a ‘critical juncture’ in the 
development of the Council. The changes that were motivated by, inter alia, 
bringing about a greater coherence, continuity and streamlined representation 
resulted, among other things, in the loss of most of the rotating Presidency’s functions 
in the area of CFSP. Moreover, the member state representatives are confronted with a 
new service in Brussels presiding over a large part of the EU’s external action 
machinery. This triggered the need to establish practices for cooperation and joint 
work between the member state governments (especially the one holding the rotating 
Presidency) and the EEAS. It also created tensions between the new system’s demands 
for increased efficiency and the need to maintain political ownership of European 
foreign policy among member states. Gradual work in the spheres of 1) long-term 
planning, 2) common representation and 3) institutional memory of the Service might 
increase the efficiency of the EU’s external actions. But short-term costs are self-
evident: member states’ engagement is at stake. EU external action and especially the 
CFSP can only be conducted on behalf of the member states, which have to ‘buy into’ 
the new structures and feel represented by the different policy choices. Greater 
efficiency of the new service can also increase the feeling of ownership among the 
member states, which in times of austerity need to see that the common foreign policy 
institutions provide added value.  
In this chapter, we present the emerging central role played by the HR/VP supported 
by the EEAS as the new permanent Presidency of the Foreign Affairs Council. First we 
look at the new organisational set-up of the Council’s work and the European Council. 
Secondly we examine quantitatively the CFSP statements and declarations that the 
T
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High Representative issues. In the third part we look at the new relationship between 
the permanent leadership (provided by the HR/VP and the EEAS) and the rotating 
Council Presidency. 
2.1 The new set-up of the Foreign Affairs Council: Making sense of 
complexity 
The Lisbon Treaty added complexity to the rules of chairmanship in the Council in 
which members of the rotating Presidency had previously chaired almost every 
Council formation and preparatory body. With the new treaty, the old General Affairs 
and External Relations Council (GAERC) was split into two formations: Foreign Affairs 
Council (FAC) and General Affairs Council (GAC). The rotating Council Presidency 
continues to chair the General Affairs Council. The new Foreign Affairs Council, 
dealing with foreign policy, development and defence, is chaired by the HR/VP.1 
Within the new system, officials of the EEAS have taken over the chair from the 
rotating Council Presidency of the majority of working groups that prepare the 
meetings of the Foreign Ministers (see Annex 1), including the important Political and 
Security Committee (PSC). Furthermore, the EEAS prepares the draft documents that 
form the basis for discussions in these working groups up to the FAC level. However, 
the rotating Presidency still chairs foreign policy-relevant gatherings, like working 
groups on trade (including the Council-level meetings when trade-related issues are 
discussed), development and meetings of the permanent representatives (COREPER 
meetings). A system in which vertical coherence across Council levels and horizontal 
coherence across policy fields was partly ensured by the common chairmanship of the 
rotating Presidency made way for a more complex system that triggers the need for an 
effective coordination between the EEAS and the rotating Presidency. However, it 
bears the great potential of a more continuous foreign policy with planning horizons 
that are longer than the six-month periods of the rotating Presidency. 
                                                     
1 On trade matters, the Foreign Affairs Council is chaired by the rotating presidency. 
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Figure 1. The decision-making flow under the new Foreign Affairs Council 
 
Source: Authors’ own compilation. 
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practice, the agenda was not set for the five-year term, but for shorter planning 
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changes in the priorities of the HR/VP and the member states. However, the HR/VP 
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were also addressed in a letter from 12 Foreign Ministers to the HR/VP and in the 
‘Future of Europe’ report of 11 Foreign Ministers.2 They suggest finding better ways to 
identify political priorities, a yearly (or half-yearly) agenda for the meetings as well as 
more regular decision-making and policy papers.  
Furthermore, interviews with EU officials and member state diplomats revealed that 
the EEAS and HR/VP are missing the ‘drive’ of the rotating Presidency in its agenda-
management, as they do not have similar deadlines of a half-yearly rotating 
Presidency. In addition, the member-state rotating Presidency – in contrast to the 
Presidency by the HR/VP and EEAS – has also been conditioned by its domestic, 
historical, as well as, geographical preferences that ‘naturally’ feed into the formulation 
of their priorities. 
Based on these experiences, which revealed shortcomings in the formulation and 
implementation of the agenda, there is now a demand from the member states to 
develop clear procedures for a stable agenda-management. One way to ensure a better 
identification of priorities is to draw from the experiences of the rotating Presidency, 
which enters its term with formulated priorities for its six month. Starting with the next 
mandate for the HR/VP in 2014, the incumbent together with the EEAS and in 
cooperation with the upcoming rotating Presidency should as well formulate the ‘High 
Representative priorities’, which would address the first half of its office. Similar to the 
long-practiced exercise of formulating the priorities of the rotating Presidency, this 
should be an inclusive process, including for example conferences that ensure the input 
of the wider academic and think tank world. By clearly setting out this procedure in 
the upcoming review of the EEAS, the member states can nudge the upcoming HR/VP 
to develop a vision for its term of office and trigger the political drive needed for the 
implementation of the agenda. Based on this set of developed priorities, the EEAS and 
HR/VP can structure the monthly agenda of meetings in a more efficient and goal-
oriented way. 
                                                     
2 Joint letter to the HR of the Union from the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden, 8 
December 2011.  
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Recommendation 
Starting with the next mandate for the HR/VP in 2014, the incumbent together with 
the EEAS and in cooperation with the upcoming rotating presidencies should 
formulate the ‘priorities of the High Representative’ for the first half of its office. 
In addition, the non-rotating Presidency has consequences for the daily work of the 
various working parties in the Council. Member state diplomats appreciate the greater 
continuity of the chairing according to the new institutional rules. The ‘January gap’ 
and the ‘July gap’ – the time each rotating Presidency needed to settle in and reach full 
cruising speed – are now eliminated. However, permanent chairs of working groups 
have to face new challenges. Before the Lisbon Treaty, member states could be certain 
that in the future they would chair foreign affairs preparatory working groups in the 
privileged position of the rotating Presidency. An EEAS institutional chair does not 
represent a ‘fellow member state’. A new kind of relationship is being developed 
between the permanent chairs of the FAC and its subsidiary bodies and other 
members. Early experiences are mixed: if member state representatives are denied 
access to certain information or feel excluded in the process of drafting decisions, the 
new set-up is likely to lead to lower trust towards the permanent chair. It is thus 
important for the chairing persons to pay greater attention to include all interested 
members in the process.  
The informal modes of working together in the various groups are decisive factors for 
their effectiveness. In fact, member state representatives acknowledge that compared to 
the times of the rotating Presidency more efforts are being made by the appointed 
EEAS chairs to communicate and consult with them on an informal basis ahead of 
meetings in order to find possibilities for agreement at earlier stages. As emphasised in 
interviews with officials, it is also important for member state representatives to win 
the chair of their group for their argument, especially if they have less political clout on 
a specific foreign policy issue. Since the chairperson does not rotate every six months, 
in principle the relationships that are developed should be more lasting and translate 
into greater cohesiveness of the group.  
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In the end, the personal qualities of the chair are of utmost importance to secure the 
feeling of ‘ownership’ on the part of the member states. Many of the EEAS chair 
holders have previously been part of a working group as national representatives, an 
experience that helps them to run their group effectively. A sustainable system of 
selection of chairpersons of the working groups, including the consultation of all the 
members of the group (as was done during the selection of the PSC chair) would lay 
the basis for securing good working relations between the EEAS and the member state 
in general, and between the permanent chairs and the member states representatives in 
the working groups in particular. 
Recommendation 
In the review of the recruitment process, special attention should be given to the 
selection of the working group chairs. This should include the consultation of the 
members of the respective working group. 
The PSC is still the ‘linchpin’ of the CFSP, as it prepares most of the security and 
foreign policy-related items of the Council meetings. Comprised of representatives at 
ambassadorial level from the permanent representations in Brussels, it becomes – 
especially in times of international crises – the de facto main forum for coordination 
and development of consent on EU foreign policy issues that are sensitive and cannot 
be resolved at a working group level. During the height of the ‘Arab spring’ in 2011, 
the PSC was meeting almost daily to discuss the measures to be taken by the EU.  
However, it plays a subordinate role to COREPER, which is the official body for the 
preparation of all Council meetings and is still being chaired by the rotating Council 
Presidency. Thus, every text has to pass through COREPER and is subject to a 
horizontal check on institutional, financial and legal implications. When urgent crises 
leave only limited time for a COREPER meeting, this can lead to situations in which 
the permanent representatives are only able to ‘rubberstamp’ the text agreed by the 
PSC. This unsatisfactory situation arose before the Lisbon Treaty, but it continued 
under the new institutional architecture. To prevent such situations, it is important that 
the EEAS is able to prepare the meetings in the Council in a way that leaves enough 
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time to the permanent representatives in COREPER to work on the draft texts. In 
addition, the member states’ permanent representations have to ensure communication 
and coordination between the PSC ambassador and the COREPER representative to 
keep the latter informed on the timing and the outcome of the discussions. In general, 
it can be questioned if it is still necessary to have every decision pass through 
COREPER when a rapid reaction is needed. As pointed out in an interview, since the 
HR/VP and the EEAS now have the task of ensuring horizontal coherence, the 
horizontal check by COREPER becomes less relevant and the last checks for 
institutional, legal and financial implications could possibly be done by written 
procedure.  
The creation of a Political Affairs Department within the EEAS under the political 
Director Helga Schmid in 2012 can have positive effects on the relations with the 
member state administrations. The department comprises inter alia the chair of the 
Political and Security Committee and is linked to the working group chairs. In its 
function it equals the political departments of national foreign ministries and might be 
vital in giving future political direction to the Service. In turn, Ms Schmid became the 
counterpart of the political directors of the national foreign ministries and consults 
with them on a regular basis. The creation of a political department at the top of the 
EEAS structure represents a significant improvement of the service, since a lack of 
political guidance at the highest level of the hierarchy was often mentioned in our 
interviews. In addition it can serve as a contact point for political sections of the 
permanent representations in Brussels. 
The involvement of the new service and the HR/VP required adjustments in the 
seating order of the FAC and its preparatory bodies (see Figure 2). In all working 
groups preparing the PSC and FAC, the chairperson is flanked by a representative of 
the EEAS and a representative of the General-Secretariat of the Council. The 
Commission is seated on the opposite side of the table as usual. Some officials see the 
EEAS official sitting next to the chairman as a “strategic mistake”. The role of the EEAS 
official is less about supporting the chairperson (which is in most cases from the EEAS 
as well), but more about giving input to the discussion from the perspective of the 
executive, such as reporting back from international meetings. In this regard the job of 
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the EEAS official is much closer to the one of the Commission representative in the 
group. The seating arrangement at present does not allow the Commission and the 
EEAS officials to coordinate their reporting and forces them to “play ping-pong across 
the table”. Sitting next to each other instead of at opposing ends of the table could 
foster the coordination between the EEAS and the Commission and increase the 
coherence on working level. 
Figure 2. Current seating order in the Council bodies 
 
Recommendation 
In the respective Council bodies, the representatives of the European Commission 
and the EEAS should be sitting next to each other, opposite to the chairperson and 
GSC official at the other side of the table, in order to allow for a better coordination 
on a working level. 
At the highest level, the permanent chairing by the HR/VP has visible impact on the 
work of the Foreign Affairs Council. Clashes between the HR/VP and the ministers 
have been reported3 and those responsible for managing the agenda are facing 
challenges. However, the day-by-day running of the meetings has improved and it 
                                                     
3 For example, the Swedish Foreign Minister criticised the HR/VP for trying to leave the 
discussions on Libya before they were completed for another meeting; see “Running out of 
friends”, European Voice, 24 March 2011 (http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/ 
running-out-of-friends/70622.aspx). 
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could be seen as an advantage for the HR/VP not to be a member of the group of 
foreign ministers, as it enables the incumbent to take a more assertive stance during the 
meetings. Apparently, according to an official interviewed for this paper, the High 
Representative tries to prevent foreign ministers from reopening closed items if they 
cannot produce a solid reason and to cut interventions short. While trying to act as a 
‘moderator’ to keep the discussion focused, it is equally important for the HR/VP to 
have an in-depth understanding of the member states’ ambitions and preferences in 
order to be able to play the political role of an ‘honest broker’. 
European Council renewed 
The post-Lisbon period witnessed three major institutional changes in relation to the 
European Council. Firstly, the European Council (established in 1975) became de jure 
an EU institution. The role of the European Council is to give the necessary impetus for 
the EU’s development and define the Union’s general political directions and priorities. 
Based on the European Council’s general guidelines, the Foreign Affairs Council is 
tasked to conceptualise the EU external action. Secondly, the Lisbon Treaty established 
a post of the European Council’s President who is elected for two and half years and 
can be re-elected only once. In addition to the Heads of State or Government and the 
permanent President, the membership of the European Council includes the President 
of the Commission. The High Representative takes part in the work of the European 
Council. Thirdly, differently from the pre-Lisbon era, the member states’ foreign 
ministers – except special meetings – do not take part in the European Council. 
In managing the agenda of the European Council, the permanent President follows the 
priorities set by the EU Heads of State or Government. During his first term, President 
Herman Van Rompuy largely focused on the European sovereign debt crisis. The 
president also aimed to increase the level of ownership of the EU external action by the 
Heads of State or Government, through facilitating regular debates on foreign policy 
items in the European Council. However, the ‘euro-crisis’ regularly hijacked the 
agenda. 
In the past, the European Council frequently stimulated the developments of the 
common EU foreign policy through its conclusions. Nevertheless, in the post-Lisbon 
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period, the role of the European Council as a foreign policy forum has been 
strengthened once more. One example was the October 2010 summit with a special 
emphasis on external action. Van Rompuy intended to trigger a debate on the 
interaction with the EU’s strategic partners, as a reaction to the low profile of the Union 
at the Copenhagen climate negotiations in December 2009. High Representative 
Ashton was tasked to prepare and present the major issues related to the EU’s strategic 
partners. Her presentation was not received favourably, however.  
Although he has become involved in foreign policy, Herman Van Rompuy as President 
of the European Council, has rarely been involved in the Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). While developments in CSDP in general were rapidly 
progressing in the last decade, the momentum seems to have been lost in recent years, 
despite the launch of a few missions. Consequently, close observers state that there is 
no political requirement to engage in CSDP from the European Council nor is there 
‘market demand’ for that. This is also reflected in the President’s position towards the 
common defence policy, which shows little ambition. With the exception of attending 
the NATO Summit in Chicago (2012), Van Rompuy has not been active in the 
framework of CSDP-NATO cooperation either. The year 2013 might show a greater 
focus on common defence as the December European Council meeting will have a 
special focus on this policy field and several member states aspire to use the 
opportunity to progress in pooling and sharing of capabilities and better cooperation in 
defence. 
The European Council’s greater importance in the EU external action is seen as having 
been developed at the expense of the Foreign Ministers. In times of crisis when 
important decisions have to be taken urgently (e.g. Libya), the Heads of State or 
Government and their aids take centre stage and the foreign ministers are often 
sidelined. On the one hand, the absence of the foreign ministers from the European 
Council solves the issues of overcrowding (from 60+ to 30+ people). On the other hand, 
it partially breaks the link between foreign ministries and the Heads of State or 
Government. Interviews reveal that in matters of urgency the regular EU foreign 
policy-making machinery, including the Foreign Affairs Council, the Political and 
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Security Committee (PSC), the working groups and the EEAS, cease to be an integral 
part of the European Council’s decision-making process. 
A broken link between the European Council and the rest of the foreign policy 
machinery can also be identified in ‘normal times’. The EEAS participates in the 
activities of the European Council through multiple doors. The service supports three 
members of the European Council, namely the President of the European Council, the 
High Representative and the President of the European Commission. However the 
service, as well as the working groups over which it presides in the Council, are not 
directly involved in drafting the general conclusions. In the pre-Lisbon era, the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) prepared the meetings of the 
European Council and was responsible for drafting the European Council Conclusions. 
In the post-Lisbon period, the President of the European Council and General Affairs 
Council prepare the meetings with involvement of the rotating Presidency and the 
President of the Commission. Conversely, neither the Foreign Affairs Council nor the 
High Representative are a formal part of this preparatory process. 
Before Lisbon, both the European Council and the Council were chaired by the rotating 
Council Presidency, which facilitated a strong link between the two bodies. After 
Lisbon, the Foreign Affairs Council as well as the European Council have a permanent 
chairperson. In addition, the Treaty gives the European Council President a role in 
ensuring the external representation of the Union on issues concerning its common 
foreign and security policy on his level. The fact that both posts are permanent and 
have competences in CFSP should be seen as an opportunity. This creates the chance to 
institute procedures for close cooperation that also bridge the broken link between 
foreign ministries and the heads of state and government. Common initiatives of the 
two posts that are centrally located in the decision-making of the EU architecture can 
have an important impact on the developments in CFSP and CSDP. 
2.2 A spokesperson of the Union – CFSP statements and declarations 
Statements and declarations are some of the traditional tools used by the EU to react to 
international developments. Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there were two actors 
responsible for issuing statements and declarations in the area of CFSP: the High 
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Representative and the rotating Council Presidency. The High Representative issued 
statements on his behalf (e.g. “I welcome…”). The rotating Presidency was in charge of 
issuing the formal declarations on behalf of the entire EU, speaking on behalf of all 
member states (e.g. “The EU welcomes…”). The declarations by the Presidency had to 
be formally approved by all member states and were revised via the COREU network 
(see below). The Treaty of Lisbon empowered the High Representative to issue both 
statements on her behalf as well as declarations on behalf of the Union. The subtle 
nuance that all member states need to approve declarations, while statements do not 
necessarily take every single member state’s opinion into account, is probably not 
recognised by all third parties. Consequently, statements by the High Representative 
are likely to be seen as the EU position by the external partners and European public 
opinion, even if all with all member states have not been consulted beforehand. 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon’s entrance into force, a new development is taking place: the 
HR/VP statements become much more frequently used than the CFSP declarations 
(see Figure 3). The quantity of statements of the High Representative has increased, 
while fewer declarations on behalf of the Union have been issued. The decline in 
declarations is probably also due to the fact that in the previous system the rotating 
Presidencies had tendencies to issue declarations to improve their international profile. 
Since the end of 2009, this practice has declined; now the High Representative uses 
statements instead of declarations, which – at least in theory – allow her to react more 
timely without lengthy consultation. The ‘Arab spring’ of 2011 in particular, triggered 
a considerable increase in the number of CFSP statements being issued and a growing 
gap between statements and declarations.  
The use of statements can help the HR/VP to develop a stronger international profile, 
especially if the incumbent uses the leeway of its double mandate as High 
Representative and Vice-President of the Commission (see more in section 2). Issuing 
statements that are more assertive and pronounced is not without political risk. 
Sometimes, member states do not agree with the specific details of a statement, but so 
far these disagreements have largely been kept behind closed doors. 
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Figure 3. Statements and declarations 
 
Notes: Statements with direct quotes were included for the High Representative Solana and Ashton. 
Speeches, press conference remarks, statements by spokespersons and nominations (except EUSRs), have 
been excluded.  
Sources: Solana statements: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/javier-solana-offline/press-
releases.aspx?lang=en&BID=109&page=arch; Ashton statements: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/hr/ 
index_en.htm; Declarations: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/foreign-policy/cfsp-statements. 
aspx?lang=en&BID=73.  
 
A greater disassociation of the national foreign ministers and the national foreign 
ministries with the European foreign policy has to be avoided. For the HR/VP and the 
European foreign policy to be effective, the ownership by the EU member states is a 
conditio sine qua non. The political challenge of the HR/VP is to find the right balance 
between two objectives. On the one hand, statements have to reflect the positions of the 
member states, as EU foreign policy in its current intergovernmental character cannot 
work without and especially not against the member states. On the other hand, a 
situation in which statements only reflect the lowest common denominator of the 
member states would fall short of the EU’s ambition to become a global actor. 
Despite the centralisation by the Treaty of Lisbon of the European foreign policy 
leadership, the EU still has multiple actors that issued statements in this area. On 
several occasions, the HR/VP’s statements were issued only after similar statements 
had been released by the Commission President José Manuel Barroso, President of the 
European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, and the President of the European 
Parliament, Martin Schulz. The HR/VP was the last among the EU leaders to issue 
statements after the killing of Osama Bin Laden in May 2011, or the death of Muammar 
Gaddafi in October 2011. The Lisbon Treaty assigned responsibilities to EU leaders for 
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making statements. The Commission is entitled to represent the Union on Community 
issues and the President of the European Council represents CFSP on his level. While 
in theory this should delineate who speaks on which issues, in practice these actors are 
commenting on international developments even if they do not fall within their 
competence.  
Recommendation 
A more coherent image of foreign policy at the EU level can be projected if the press 
offices of HR/VP and of the President of the European Council as well as of the 
European Commission work to ensure a maximum of coordination on the basis of 
the competences assigned to each of the leaders. Accordingly, the HR/VP and the 
President of the European Council should be the first to speak on matters of CFSP 
and make more frequent use of joint statements. The European Parliament President 
should withhold its foreign policy statements until the HR/VP speaks. 
2.3 What role for the rotating Presidency in CFSP? 
The rotating Council Presidency has lost its day-to-day agenda-setting power, as it no 
longer presides over most of the preparatory bodies or the Council meeting itself. 
However, the rotating Presidency still has a role to play regarding the international 
activities of the EU: it chairs some of the working parties and Council formations with 
effect on the EU’s external profile and its priorities usually touch on external action 
issues and its foreign minister even sometimes represents the EU internationally, 
replacing the HR/VP.  
What lessons can be learned from the first presidencies under Lisbon rules? The year 
2010 was a transitional period, as the Foreign Affairs Council preparatory working 
parties and the PSC were still chaired by the rotating Presidency. Spain had to prepare 
its 2010 Presidency before the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty, without an 
empowered HR/VP and the EEAS in place (hence a Spanish diplomat was among the 
HR/VP closest advisors during the six-month term). Belgium and Hungary, as the two 
following Presidencies, respected the new rules which foresaw a limited role of the 
Presidency. The interpretation of their role was mainly supportive of the activities of 
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the High Representative and her team. As such, those presidencies did not have a 
strong foreign policy profile. Their experience has been indicative and the model of the 
‘supportive Presidency’ has been largely pursued by the successive Council 
presidencies of Poland, Denmark and Cyprus. 
However, the second semester of 2011, during the Polish Presidency, saw the 
cooperation between the High Representative and the rotating Presidency slightly 
modified. The two actors agreed that the national Foreign Affairs Minister would 
represent the Union also on official trips. Unlike on other occasions, the 
‘representation’ function was not delegated exclusively to the country holding the 
rotating Presidency. The HR/VP and the Polish Minister concluded the list of 
replacements ahead of the six-months, which gave the Presidency leeway to pursue its 
own interests. Such an approach goes beyond pure representational functions, and 
represents a greater involvement in policy-definition. For example, the Polish Foreign 
Minister went on a policy trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan, where the EU diplomats 
assisted him. An equally close partnership developed between the two figures during 
the establishment of the European Endowment for Democracy. However, the 
somewhat upgraded Polish Council Presidency performance on foreign policy issues 
remained largely limited in scope. No ‘resurgence’ of the rotating Council Presidency 
undermining the position of the new structures has taken place so far in the foreign 
policy domain. 
EU Correspondents 
An excellent indicator for the ‘day-by-day’ participation of member states and 
institutions in CFSP is the network of the European Correspondents (COREU). It 
serves as the main communications network in the area of CFSP and links the Council 
Secretariat, Commission and, since January 2011, also the EEAS with the foreign 
ministries in the national capitals. Messages are circulated via this network in order to 
clear declarations, get input from national ministries, prepare the Council work and 
issue démarches to be carried out by heads of Union delegations. In analysing the 
number of messages processed, the most remarkable – but also intuitive – observation 
is the landslide decline of involvement of the rotating Presidency in this 
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communication network (see Table 1 below) since the beginning of 2010. The numbers 
of messages sent by the member states holding the rotating Presidency crashed from 
2008 to 2011, clearly showing the impact of the changes of the Lisbon Treaty in the real 
world. In 2009, the two Presidency countries (the Czech Republic and Sweden) were 
sending 23.55% of all messages. This number dropped to 9.4% for the presidencies in 
2010. While Spain was still one of the more involved countries with 7.24%, the Belgian 
input did not significantly increase when it took over the Presidency. According to this 
indicator, the rotating Presidency did not have a major role in the policy formulation of 
CFSP anymore. This trend of low participation continued with the Hungarian 
Presidency and with the allegedly more ambitious Polish Presidency. 
Table 1. Number of messages sent in the COREU network 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Total 10201 9462 8476 7030 
  Total % Total % Total % Total % 
Gen-Sec Council 2,583 25 % 2,603 27.51 % 2,706 31.93 % 971 13.81 % 
EEAS - - - - - - 1,888 26.86 % 
European 
Commission 288 2.82 % 215 2.27 % 483 5.70 % 53 0.75 % 
27 MS 7,330 71.86 % 6,644 70.22 % 5,287 62.38 % 4,118 58.58 % 
Slovenia 1,159 11.36 % 126 1.33 % 77 0.91 % 61 0.87 % 
France 1,362 13.35 % 461 4.87 % 457 5.39 % 396 5.63 % 
Czech Republic 222 2.18 % 1,138 12.03 % 163 1.92 % 118 1.68 % 
Sweden 225 2.21 % 1,090 11.52 % 197 2.32 % 147 2.09 % 
Spain 209 2.05 % 249 2.63 % 614 7.24 % 199 2.83 % 
Belgium 208 2.04 % 146 1.54 % 183 2.16 % 166 2.36 % 
Hungary 110 1.08 % 81 0.86 % 81 0.96 % 112 1.59 % 
Poland 119 1.17 % 85 0.90 % 79 0.93 % 119 1.69 % 
Germany 732 7.18 % 648 6.85 % 958 11.30 % 562 7.99 % 
UK 538 5.27 % 541 5.72 % 609 7.18 % 534 7.60 % 
Italy 314 3.08 % 248 2.62 % 267 3.15 % 242 3.44 % 
* Figures in bold denote messages sent by the country holding the rotating Presidency. 
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Likewise, with the formal establishment of the EEAS, the participation of the Council 
Secretariat – previously the ‘hub’ for CFSP coordination and management4 – has 
decreased with its reduced administrative role in the organisation of the Council 
meetings. In the beginning of 2011, the biggest share of messages has been sent by the 
EEAS, due to the fact that the EEAS is now not only de jure, but also de facto steering the 
agenda in CFSP. Accordingly, the share of all 27 member states in the communication 
on CFSP has decreased by around 10% since the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. While it is possible to observe a high share of communication of the EEAS, 
more involvement does not necessarily mean more impact on policy formulation. 
However, it shows that the EEAS engages with the member states and may provide 
added value via common reporting and policy formulation. 
The new CFSP role of the Council rotating Presidency 
The rotating Presidency might formally not be in the ‘driver’s seat’ of CFSP anymore, 
but it is still vital in EU external action, either because of its competences assigned by 
the treaty, or in its supporting role for the High Representative. 
First, in all matters that are outside or at the edge of CFSP, the rotating Presidency’s 
activities are based on competences imposed by the Treaty. The rotating Presidency 
still chairs Council working groups that are relevant for the external action of the 
Union. Not all working parties are chaired by the EEAS, amongst them the working 
party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), which deals with horizontal financial 
and institutional aspects and coordinates the agenda of the PSC and COREPER. All 
issues prepared by the PSC still have to pass COREPER chaired by the rotating 
Presidency, which also prepares (with the help of the working groups) the FAC items 
that are not crisis-and security-related. Furthermore, Council formations in the remit of 
the rotating Presidency have external implications as well, like the trade formation of 
the FAC, the General Affairs Council (as it prepares the European Council and deals 
with enlargement matters) or the Environment Council. 
                                                     
4 See Bicchi & Carta (2010). 
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In addition, the rotating Presidency still plays a role in representing and negotiating 
matters other than CFSP that do not fall within the area of exclusive competences of the 
Union. Especially for competences shared with the member states,5 the rotating 
Presidency shares the external representation with the European Commission. In the 
past this has led to rows with the Commission on who is allowed to negotiate on behalf 
of the Union on international agreements as well as on non-legal binding issues at 
international conferences and events.6 In the case of the UN negotiations on mercury in 
June 2010, this led to a deadlock and the EU ended up with no mandate to negotiate.7 
As a consequence, practical arrangements are now adopted on the working 
party/COREPER level on a case-by-case basis with defined roles of the Commission, 
the Presidency and possibly other member states.  
Second, in the area of CFSP, the Council Presidency acts in a ‘supporting’ manner. The 
rotating Presidency acts as the deputy of the HR/VP in various situations and formats. 
Members of the Presidency or the trio-Presidency are foreseen to deputise the High 
Representative vis-à-vis the European Parliament on matters of CFSP. If the High 
Representative is not able to preside over the Foreign Affairs Council, which 
sometimes is the case due to her travel commitments, one of the ministers of the 
rotating Presidency replaces her as the chair. This was the case at the informal defence 
minister meetings of the Spanish, Belgian and Polish presidencies. Furthermore, the 
September Defence Ministers Meeting coincided with the UN General Assembly, 
forcing the HR/VP to prioritise one event over the other. The ‘Gymnich’ meetings are 
                                                     
5 Shared competences are defined in Art. 4(2) TFEU: internal market; social policy, for the 
aspects defined in the Treaty; economic, social and territorial cohesion; agriculture and fisheries, 
excluding the conservation of marine biological resources; environment; consumer protection; 
transport; trans-European networks; energy; area of freedom, security and justice; common 
safety concerns in public health matters, for the aspects defined in the Treaty. 
6 The treaty does not delineate competences between the Commission and the Presidency in 
these cases. While the Commission claims to have a ‘universal’ representative role according to 
Art. 17(1) TEU, the Presidency argues that Article 218 TFEU gives the member states the 
possibility to choose the negotiator. 
7 For an in-depth analysis of the status quo of EU representation, see Emerson et al., Upgrading 
the EU’s Role as Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, January 
2011, Brussels (http://www.ceps.eu/book/upgrading-eus-role-global-actor-institutions-law-
and-restructuring-european-diplomacy). 
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co-chaired by the Foreign Minister of the rotating Presidency. Moreover, vis-à-vis 
international partners, the High Representative has to draw on the Presidency to act on 
her behalf. The EU delegation to Association Council meetings are headed by the 
foreign minister of the Council Presidency, who also chairs the meetings. In addition, it 
is sometimes the case that the foreign minister of the rotating Presidency represents the 
High Representative in bilateral meetings.  
While all bilateral summits are now held in Brussels (when the host is the EU), 
multilateral summits are hosted in the member states of the rotating Presidency. Thus, 
Spain hosted the EU-LAC summit, Belgium hosted the ASEM summit and the Eastern 
Partnership summit was supposed to take place in Hungary, but was postponed and 
was then hosted by Poland in September 2011. 
The EU delegations do not cover the entire world. Wherever the Union is not 
represented by an EU delegation, the Service has to draw on the resources of the 
rotating Presidency or one of the upcoming Presidency countries.8 For example, this 
was the case during the uprising in Libya in 2011 when the Hungarian embassy on the 
ground coordinated the rescue efforts of EU citizens.9 There are also no EU delegations 
in a number of countries such as Iran and North Korea. 
The rotating Presidency is essential in providing political impetus, by pushing forward 
initiatives during its six-month term. There are first signs that the abolishment of the 
six-month rotation in CFSP may lead to a decrease of political drive: the EEAS has 
different deadlines to accomplish its priorities. In addition, priorities and ambitions 
that stem from geographical and historical characteristics of the member state holding 
the Presidency are not ‘natural’ characteristics of an institution like the EEAS.  
                                                     
8 The half-yearly list is composed by indicating the member states that represent and coordinate 
the EU position in third countries without Union delegations; see for example, EEAS, “EU 
diplomatic representation in third countries − Second half of 2012”, 11522/1/12, REV 1, 
Brussels, 2012. 
9 “Hungarian Presidency’s contribution to the EU’s response on the events in the Southern 
Mediterranean”, Press Release, Brussels, 23 February 2011 
(http://www.eu2011.hu/de/node/14122). 
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The role the rotating Presidency plays in international activities of the EU triggers the 
need of intensive coordination between the Council Presidency staff and the EEAS. No 
written rules of cooperation have been laid down; however, practices emerged 
between the two executives. The Spanish Presidency in 2010, which came before the 
EEAS was in place, represented a special case. During the crises of this period (the 
military operation of Israel against the Gaza flotilla and the earthquake in Haiti), the 
Spanish PSC ambassador was invited to the meetings of the HR/VP’s cabinet. With the 
EEAS in place, the Presidency has regular meetings before and during the term with 
the policy coordination unit of the EEAS and stays in contact with HR/VP’s cabinet 
members. Given the slight ad hoc nature of cooperation in the ‘Presidency-Cabinet-
EEAS triangle’ that builds on personal relationships between the actors in the three 
entities, there is space for a more structural approach of cooperation. 
Recommendation 
Procedures for the coordination of HR/VP and the rotating Presidency should be 
clarified, 
- to ensure coherence of the international activities of the EU under the Council 
chairmanship of the High Representative and the rotating Presidency, 
- to ensure communication with the rotating Presidency in cases where a minister 
has to represent the HR/VP and 
- to allow the rotating Presidency to give political impetus to the development of 
EU foreign policy. 
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3. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE EEAS AND THE 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
he relations between the European Commission and the new European External 
Action Service (EEAS) highlight some of the most problematic issues raised by the 
creation of this new body. The process leading up to the creation of the EEAS was often 
characterised by tensions between the actors involved in EU external action after the 
establishment of the new service. Most of these debated issues concerned the 
competences of the EEAS. Since the Commission has retained many external action 
portfolios and remained the EU institution that manages the external action 
operational budgets, it is of vital importance that the EEAS and the Commission 
develop good and effective working relations. 
According to the Treaty, the Commission ensures the EU’s external representation with 
the exception of CFSP (covered by the president of the European Council, the High 
Representative/EEAS and the member states) but, at the same time, it is the High 
Representative with the help of the EEAS who has to ensure the coordination and 
consistency of the external action of the Union. While one of the major innovations of 
the Lisbon Treaty was that the High Representative is also anchored in the 
Commission where it has to coordinate the EU’s external action, we can still observe 
tensions in the system.  
The EEAS’s intention to coordinate some of the Commission services dealing with 
external action was generally met by opposition. These Commission DGs, consisting of 
the Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation - EuropeAid (DG DEVCO), 
the Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO), the 
Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Directorate-General for Trade (DG 
TRADE), are established institutions that have been working on external action for 
many years and are – sometimes with good arguments – reluctant to be coordinated by 
T
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a new service from outside their structures. Many officials in the Commission were 
apprehensive about the creation of a new service outside the Commission structures. 
The main reason voiced was the fear of the influence of member states over the 
integrated areas of the EU’s external action. Having the EEAS formally created outside 
of the Commission, according to this perspective, is a dangerous development of 
national governments creeping back into Community competences. At the same time, 
the policy objectives of the Commission sometimes differ from those of the member 
states. Thus, some of the Commission services feared that the creation of the EEAS 
could lead to a politicisation of their work (e.g. in trade, development or humanitarian 
aid).  
The negotiations over the delimitation of competences between the Union’s institutions 
and the EEAS resulted in the Commission retaining its trade, development, 
humanitarian aid and enlargement portfolios. Additionally, several units from the 
External Relations Directorate (DG RELEX) were transferred in the months preceding 
the creation of the EEAS to the two new Commission DGs dealing with energy and 
climate action. To external observers, the Commission was seen as defending its turf 
and trying to retain its external action portfolios. Another early manifestation of this 
was the February 2010 nomination of João Vale de Almeida, a former head of cabinet 
of Commission President Barroso, as head of the EU Delegation in Washington. This 
action raised eyebrows in EU capitals and was seen as an attempt by president Barroso 
to retain influence on EU-US relations. EEAS officials were also unhappy with the 
narrow view of the Commission on the sharing of information. The lack of 
coordination between the Commission and the EEAS was visible during the February 
2011 visit of Prime Minister Putin to Brussels with EEAS officials claiming that the 
briefings for the meeting were coordinated by the Commission and not shared with the 
EEAS.  
In order to clear some of the institutional fog regarding inter-institutional relations 
with the new service, the Secretariat-General of the Commission issued at the 
beginning of 2010 a Vademecum on Working Relations with the European External Action 
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Service (EEAS). The document was not well received within the EEAS, and several 
officials complained10 that their units were not consulted during the writing process. 
Other officials from the EEAS as well as from the Commission were also critical11 of the 
heavy-handed way in which the Commission Secretariat-General managed the 
separation of DG RELEX from the Commission structure. This initial push to create a 
clear line of demarcation between the Commission and the EEAS was later replaced 
with a more inclusive approach that led to an improvement of relations. Since then, the 
Commission and the EEAS have negotiated more detailed working arrangements.12 
The Commission has also issued an updated version of the vademecum13 mentioned and 
a new Vademecum on the External Action of the European Union14 aimed at clarifying 
issues related to the principles of the external action of the EU, the external 
representation of the EU and the negotiation of international agreements. 
Most of the former DG RELEX officials have kept their portfolios and after over two 
years of its establishment, more than one-third of the EEAS staff still originates from 
the Commission. This has ensured a certain continuity in its relations with the other 
institutions and was particularly important in its relation with the European 
Commission. Effectively, many of the institutional tensions related to the establishment 
of the EEAS were ironed out by these already existing working and personal 
relationships between officials.  
This could change in a longer-term perspective as more member states diplomats are 
hired into the EEAS. Thus, providing adequate training to these diplomats on the 
workings of the EU institutions is central for maintaining an effective collaboration 
                                                     
10 According to several EEAS officials interviewed, May-June 2011. 
11 As remarked in interviews by European Commission and EEAS officials, June, July and 
August 2011. 
12 European Commission (2012) Working Arrangements between Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in Relation to External Relations Issues, 13 January 
2012, SEC(2012)48. 
13 European Commission (2011), Vademecum on Working Relations with the European External 
Action Service (EEAS), SEC(2011)1636. 
14 European Commission (2011), Vademecum on the External Action of the European Union, 
SEC(2011)881. 
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between the Commission and the EEAS. Otherwise, a widening gap between the 
Service and the Commission could pose serious problems to the operation of the EU’s 
foreign policy machinery. 
Recommendation 
Adequate training on the workings of the EU institutions for member state 
diplomats is central for maintaining an effective collaboration between the European 
Commission and the EEAS.  
In the pre-EEAS days, the Commission was represented in 25 out of 39 Foreign Affairs 
Council preparatory working groups by DG RELEX. Since DG RELEX has been 
integrated in the EEAS, the role of coordination and representation of the Commission 
in these working groups has been taken over by the Secretariat-General of the 
Commission, the Directorates-General DEVCO, TRADE, ECHO, HOME, ENTR and the 
Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI).15 This gives the Commission better access to 
information and better exposure to the politics of the Council and should theoretically 
lead to better coordination between the two institutions. However, one high-ranking 
national diplomat who agreed to be interviewed for this paper described the 
Commission as being less engaged in the external action of the Union than before the 
creation of the EEAS. According to the official, if before the creation of the EEAS, the 
Commission was coming with ideas about what could be done with its instruments, 
now it seems to mostly react in order to make sure that the member states don’t 
interfere with its work. This situation should be prevented as the involvement of the 
Commission is crucial for the external action of the Union. Some of these working 
groups continue to be chaired by the rotating Presidency, but the geographical and 
CFSP working groups are now chaired by the EEAS. That means that member-state 
diplomats have to deal in these working groups with representatives of two EU bodies, 
the EEAS and the Commission, whereas previously they were working with the 
                                                     
15 A list of the Commission DGs attending the Foreign Affairs Council preparatory Working 
groups can be found in Annex 1 of this paper. 
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Commission. If the EEAS and the Commission manage to coordinate their positions 
and pass similar messages, they are likely to have a bigger influence on member states. 
The Commission and EEAS services should coordinate their positions as much as 
possible before meetings in the Council. 
3.1 General coordination of EU’s external action: The role of the HR/VP 
Besides conducting the common Foreign and Security Policy, the High 
Representative/Vice President, supported by the EEAS, has to coordinate other aspects 
of the Union’s external action and to ensure the consistency and the overall political 
coordination of the Union’s external action. In practice, however, this coordination 
authority of the HR/VP is only horizontal (among equals) and is not backed by an 
enforcement authority. 
The HR/VP is a full member and the only treaty-mentioned Vice President of the 
Commission. Hence, the High Representative fully participates in all matters addressed 
by the College. Inside the College of Commissioners, the HR/VP is the chair of the 
Group on External Relations Commissioners (the RELEX group). This group consists of 
commissioners responsible for 1) Development, 2) Enlargement and Neighbourhood 
Policy, 3) International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, 4) Trade 
and 5) Economic and Monetary Affairs. The RELEX group of Commissioners did not 
have a particularly important coordination role during the Barroso I Commission and 
the situation does not seem to have changed in the current college. The situation is 
actually worse so far during the Barroso II Commission (February 2010-December 
2012), the group has only met five times, with some of the meetings being chaired by 
the Commission president, who is allowed to chair the meetings if he chooses to. The 
low number of meetings seems to be at least partially caused by the difficulty of 
organising meetings of often-travelling Commissioners but also by the less than 
optimal personal relations between some of them. The coordination potential of the 
entire RELEX group of Commissioners has not been fully used.  
Within the RELEX group of Commissioners we can identify a smaller sub-group 
formed by commissioners Ashton, Füle, Piebalgs and Georgieva. In the time of 
appointment, these Commissioners were instructed by the Commission President that 
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they should work closely with the High Representative.16 This could have been seen as 
an attempt by the Commission President to empower the HR/VP with vertical 
coordination powers over those three Commissioners, but this does not seem to have 
happened in practice. The interactions between Commissioner Ashton and these three 
fellow Commissioners are visibly more frequent than with other Commissioners, but 
they are not of a supervisory nature.  
Recommendation 
The RELEX group of Commissioners should play a more important role in 
coordinating the EU’s external action. Organising regular coordination meetings 
between the HR/VP and the other RELEX Commissioners would also give a positive 
example to the services they coordinate and that are often competing instead of 
cooperating. 
This frequent criticism of the HR/VP leads to the question: how much of “VP” role is 
there left in the double-hatted position? Catherine Ashton is largely perceived inside 
the Commission as putting more focus on her High Representative role than on her 
role in the Commission. In a way, this is a natural development: as the HR she enjoys 
more flexibility (for example, she issues her own statements or has an individual right 
of initiative on CFSP questions), but the ‘HR’ hat also ensures her a more elevated 
position towards other members of the Commission college and the Commission 
President. An elevated position within the Commission would be justified by Art. 18(4) 
TEU, which makes the HR/VP responsible within the Commission for external 
relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action.  
One of the main problems for any coordination at the level of the College is that of time 
scarcity. In the time period between February 2010 and December 2012, the HR/VP 
had the highest number of absences (61 out of 122 meetings) in Commission college 
                                                     
16 The assignment letters received by Commissioners Füle, Piebalgs and Georgieva from 
Commission President Barroso mention the fact that they have to work closely with the HR/VP, 
but this was not the case for the letters addressed to Commissioners De Gucht and Rehn. 
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meetings of any commissioner, participating in only half of them. We can see in the 
graph below that she is followed by other commissioners with external relations 
portfolios that often require travelling. This rate of participation of 50% should be 
increased in order to allow for a better coordination between the work being done by 
Catherine Ashton under her HR and VP ‘hats’. This also raises the necessity of 
nominating a deputy of the HR/VP that would participate in the college meetings 
when s/he cannot attend. 
Recommendation 
The coordination responsibilities of the HR/VP should be clarified and the post 
should be in a position to coordinate the services in the Commission that deal with 
external action. 
The HR/VP’s rate of participation at Commission college meetings should be 
increased in order to allow for a better coordination of EU’s external action. 
Figure 4. The rate of participation at Commission college meetings 
(February 2010-December 2012)* 
 
* February 2010-October 2012 for Commissioner Dalli. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on the minutes of Commission meetings. 
If therefore the coordination level remains relatively low in the College of 
Commissioners, it is pursued elsewhere. First, it is sought mainly through the 
participation of representatives from the HR/VP cabinet or the EEAS in various 
preparatory and coordination meetings. One member of the cabinet participates in the 
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Groupe des relations interinstitutionnelles (GRI), the format used to coordinate inter-
institutional relations between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council. As is 
the case with every cabinet, the Ashton’s cabinet participates in the ‘Special Chefs’ 
meetings and the Heads of Cabinet meetings (Hebdo). The Secretariat-General of the 
Commission and the Policy Coordination Unit of the EEAS have weekly coordination 
meetings, other meetings are organised between the DGs dealing with external issues 
and the EEAS and numerous other meetings take place between the Service and the 
different Commission services. 
The EEAS and the various Commission services contribute with briefings to the each 
other’s visits and meetings with third countries and international organisation and 
share the final briefings and the final reports of the visits. The body that coordinates 
the briefing is determined by the main subject of the meeting. If it’s CFSP, the EEAS 
takes the lead, if development, it is DG DEVCO and so on. The common consultations 
and briefings play a big role in ensuring the consistency of the external action of the 
Union. 
Moreover, the EEAS is integrated into the various IT systems used by the Commission 
to manage its work. The EEAS uses the same inter-service consultation tool (CIS-Net) 
as the Commission and regularly participates in or initiates inter-service consultations. 
When it prepares and submits proposals to the Commission, the EEAS uses e-Greffe, 
the IT management system used in the Commission’s decision-making process. 
Moreover, the EEAS participates in the BASIL system used to coordinate the different 
Commission services for the preparation of replies for questions coming from the 
European Parliament. It also participates in other systems (such as Petitions 2, 
Médiateur 2 and ASAP) used for coordinating the preparations of responses to the 
opinions of national Parliaments, complaints by the Ombudsman or petitions. The 
launch of the EEAS was accompanied by various IT problems (for example the EEAS 
staff housed in the Council building did not have access to the common drives of their 
new units for several months) and the setting up of facilities in the new Brussels 
headquarters was marred by delays. 
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As the European Commission has its own internal dynamic, a closer look at the 
individual bilateral relations between the EEAS and some of the external action DGs is 
necessary. 
3.2 The EEAS and DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid  
EU development policy was one of the main bones of contention between the member 
states and the Commission, with the latter opposing any reduction in its competencies 
over development policy. Underlining this conflict was the fear coming from the 
European Parliament and the development constituency that giving the EEAS 
powerful competencies in this sector would lead to a ‘securitisation’ of aid and an 
unwelcomed political allocation of development funds.  
In the end, an agreement was reached in which the management of the Union’s 
external cooperation programmes remains under the responsibility of the Commission 
and the EEAS is expected to contribute to the programming and management cycle for 
these instruments, having responsibility for the preparation of the decisions regarding 
the strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle. The latter include: the 
country allocations, the country and regional strategy papers (CSPs/RSPs) and the 
national and regional indicative programmes (NIPs/RIPs). This will be done following 
the Commission procedures jointly with the relevant Commission services under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development (for the European 
Development Fund – EDF – and the Development Cooperation Instrument – DCI) and 
the Commissioner responsible for Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (for the European Neighbourhood Instrument). The proposals are to be 
submitted jointly for adoption by the Commission by the respective Commissioners 
and the HR/VP. 
Thematic programmes (with the exception of the European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights – EIDHR and the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation – 
INSC) are to be prepared by DG DEVCO under the guidance of the Commissioner 
responsible for Development and presented to the Commission in agreement with the 
HR/VP and other relevant Commissioners. The programming of the INSC and the 
EIDHR is prepared by the EEAS under the responsibility of the HR/VP in consultation 
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with DG DEVCO. Actions taken under the CFSP budget, certain actions under the 
Instrument for Stability, the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries, 
communication and public diplomacy and election observation are the responsibility of 
the HR/EEAS, but their financial application is done by the Foreign Policy Instruments 
(FPI) under the authority of the High Representative acting in her capacity as Vice-
President of the Commission. More detailed and clearer steps of the programming 
cycle were included in the working arrangements17 between the Commission and the 
EEAS. 
This work is done in the EEAS by the geographic and thematic units and is be 
coordinated by the Development Cooperation Coordination Division of the service, the 
development entry-exit point of the EEAS. It remains to be seen how this exercise will 
take place for the 2014-2020 period as the programming of the different instruments for 
the current multiannual financial framework predates the creation of the EEAS.  
At the level of the Council, the HR chairs the Foreign Affairs Council in its 
Development configuration, but the rotating Presidency continues to chair the CODEV 
and ACP Working Parties. This division of labour means that increased efforts need to 
be made in order to ensure a good coordination between the chairs coming from the 
rotating Presidency and the development coordination division from the EEAS.  
The EEAS was not the only body to experience institutional change. The merger of the 
former DGs DEV and AIDCO into the new DG Development and Cooperation – 
EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) – simplified the institutional setup in this field, with the 
EEAS-DEVCO duo replacing the former RELEX-DEV-AIDCO trio. However, this 
simplification has not completely eliminated institutional problems. The development 
and external relations DGs of the Commission already had a long history of rivalry but 
until now the two sides were inside the same institution. The separation of the external 
relations portfolio from the Commission structure added to this rivalry a new 
institutional dimension. At the same time, the transfer of DG RELEX outside of the 
                                                     
17 European Commission (2012), Working Arrangements between Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in Relation to External Relations Issues, 13 January 
2012, SEC(2012)48. 
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Commission structure and the other institutional changes had as an indirect 
consequence an increase in the relative weight and influence within the Commission of 
DGs such as DEVCO, TRADE and ECHO. With an increase in size and responsibilities 
(as well as confidence), DG DEVCO is loathe to be relegated to an implementation DG. 
Until now, cooperation between the EEAS and DG DEVCO has been mixed. The two 
sides cooperated reasonably well in preparing the work for the July 2011 informal 
meeting of development ministers, in particular on the development strategies towards 
Central Asia and the Pacific. However, disagreements are not rare, especially on the 
EIDHR, and cooperation tends be slow and duplication of efforts is not uncommon.  
The working arrangements will be tested during the next programming cycle for 2014-
2020 that started in 2012. As the EU institutional set-up is not likely to change 
considerably in the short term, the two bodies will have to work together more closely, 
both at their headquarters level and in the delegations. 
Recommendation 
Increased efforts need to be made in order to ensure better coordination between DG 
DEVCO and the EEAS and between the chairs of the CODEV and ACP Working 
Parties coming from the rotating Presidency and the development coordination 
division of the EEAS. 
 
3.3 The EEAS and DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Humanitarian aid is another field of EU action where cooperation between the 
European Commission (DG ECHO) and the EEAS was accompanied by inter-
institutional tensions. These tensions arise from the lack of a clear separation of 
competencies in this field between the EEAS and the Commission. The 
Commission/DG ECHO argues that humanitarian aid is a Commission prerogative 
and that the policy should be kept independent from any political negotiations. The 
independence of humanitarian aid from foreign policy objectives is also supported by 
important constituencies in the European Parliament and some of the member states. 
DG ECHO has offices throughout the world that operate independently of the EEAS 
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(even though sometimes they are located within the EU delegations) and has a 
tradition of working in this field. It therefore sees itself as the legitimate actor to 
coordinate the EU humanitarian action. While the Council Decision of July 2010 
establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS does not mention 
Humanitarian aid and civil protection among the instruments for which the EEAS is 
responsible, it does state that “the High Representative shall ensure overall political 
coordination of the Union’s external action” and that for this job she is to be supported 
by the EEAS. What this means in practical terms is the object of dispute and 
negotiation between the two bodies. 
There was a particular incident in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 that 
contributed to the tension. Partly in reaction to the criticism levelled against what was 
perceived as a lack of EU coordination and visibility after the earthquake, the HR/VP 
created within the EEAS the post of Managing Director for Crisis Response and 
Operational Coordination. The creation of the new post was seen by DG ECHO as 
encroaching on its own area of competence. The holder of this post drew additional 
criticism from the Commission service after depicting his April 2011 visit to Benghazi 
and meetings with the Libyan National Transitional Council as a “humanitarian 
mission”. This was seen by DG ECHO as an unfortunate use of the word 
“humanitarian” and as an unnecessary politicisation of the EU’s humanitarian 
assistance. 
In spite of these kinds of tensions, a general division of labour seems to be taking place. 
In cases of crises that have a humanitarian profile (e.g. natural disasters), DG ECHO is 
supposed to take the lead, whereas in cases that have stronger political and security 
implications the coordination takes place at the level of the EEAS and the Crisis 
Platform, an ad-hoc structure chaired by the HR/VP, the EEAS Executive Secretary 
General (currently Pierre Vimont) or the Managing Director of the Crisis Response 
Department, which gathers together representatives from the relevant services of the 
EEAS (the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability – CPCC, the European Union 
Military Staff - EUMS, INTCEN, the Political and Security Committee – PSC, the EU 
Situation Room and various geographical and horizontal departments), the EU 
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Military Committee (EUMC) and the Commission's relevant services (ECHO, HOME, 
DEVCO, etc.).  
However, making a clear cut difference between the two types of crises and thus 
determining who takes the lead in coordination is not that easy and in practice 
sometimes the coordination role is taken by the body who calls the meetings first. 
While DG ECHO coordinated the EU action after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in 
Japan, the EEAS was the first to call a coordination meeting in the case of the 2011 
famine in the Horn of Africa.18 The EEAS took a coordination role in the latter case 
even though officials in DG ECHO saw the crisis as falling with their territory of action 
because they and the resources they manage were the ones to be deployed in the field.  
Recommendation 
While the division of responsibility between the EEAS and DG ECHO is gaining 
ground, given the complexity of some of the crisis situations and in order to avoid 
future institutional skirmishes, the EU should further clarify the division of labour 
between the Commission and the EEAS in this area. The working arrangements 
between the EEAS-based Crisis Platform and the future Emergency Response Centre 
(ERC) that will be responsible for the coordination of the EU’s disaster response and 
will be located within DG-ECHO19 would need to be streamlined in order to avoid 
duplications and inter-institutional turf wars. 
The two bodies should use the opportunities presented by the development of the 
comprehensive approach to foreign policy by the EEAS and the Commission to 
consolidate their cooperation and working arrangements. 
                                                     
The Crisis Platform was also activated, most notably, for the crises in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire. 
19 COM(2011) 934 final, Proposal for a Decision of the European Parliament and of the  Council 
on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism, [10.12.2012] (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/about/ 
COM_2011_proposal-decision-CPMechanism_en.pdf). 
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3.4 The EEAS and DG Trade 
Trade is one of the main aspects of EU external action but also an exclusive competence 
of the Union that remained with the European Commission. The creation of the post of 
HR/VP and of the European External Action Service has not dramatically affected the 
EU’s trade policy-making machinery. In its trade configuration, the Foreign Affairs 
Council (FAC) continues to be chaired by the rotating Presidency and not the High 
Representative and so does the Trade Policy Committee (TPC) and the other trade-
related Council Working groups. DG TRADE continues to represent the Commission 
in these working groups but in addition it has received the mission to also represent 
the Commission in some of the geographical working groups20 of the Council for 
which the previous lead DG had been DG RELEX.  
The split in chairmanship between the geographical groups and the Trade Policy 
Committee has led to more formal relations between these working groups (previously 
chaired by officials from the same rotating Presidency) and to more trade issues being 
discussed in the TPC, as opposed to being discussed in the geographical workings 
groups. This split chairmanship might in the future create difficulties over 
communication and information-sharing.  
The relationship between DG TRADE and the former DG RELEX was one of the classic 
examples of EU bureaucratic rivalry. This long-standing relationship, characterized by 
both cooperation and rivalry, has been largely transposed in the new institutional set-
up. The two bodies often have to work together and depend on each other. DG TRADE 
needs the vehicle of summits and a political impulse in order to start or unlock 
negotiations, while diplomats often need trade deliverables. One example of the 
continuity is the fact that the weekly coordination meetings that were organised 
between DG TRADE and DG RELEX in order to prepare the Transatlantic Relations 
Working Group (COTRA) have been carried over and now take place between the 
EEAS, which chairs this working group, and DG TRADE which represents the 
                                                     
20 DG Trade represents the Commission in nine out of the 38 Foreign Affairs Council 
preparatory working groups. 
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Commission. However, this system of organising coordination meetings was not 
extended to all the working groups. 
Relations between the Commission (DG TRADE) and the team of the HR/VP were 
strained by what was perceived as a lack of consultation on the part of the HR/VP 
during the preparation of the progress reports about the EU’s relations with three of its 
strategic partners (Russia, China and the US), submitted to the December 2010 
European Council. Commission officials interviewed stated that they were not 
consulted during the drafting of these reports and even that their offers to contribute 
were refused. In their view, this has led to thin reports that did not fully include the 
areas of cooperation administered by the Commission (trade, energy, etc.) and thus 
proved to be a lost chance for the HR/VP to coordinate external action. There was also 
dissatisfaction in DG TRADE regarding the late delivery of texts from the EEAS that 
only allowed little time for comments or reactions and thus had an impact on the 
quality of the final product. There is evidence of a more positive trend lately, however, 
with relations between the two bodies improving. 
Recommendation 
DG TRADE and the EEAS need to agree on more detailed working arrangements 
with clear deadlines for contributions. The streamlining of the EEAS’ organigramme 
and internal procedures in order to deliver timely inputs should also be an objective. 
 
3.5 The EEAS and DG Enlargement 
Enlargement issues are discussed in the General Affairs Council that is still chaired by 
the rotating Presidency and so is the Council Working Group on Enlargement 
(COELA). On the other hand, other Council working groups dealing with the 
candidate and potential candidate countries from the Western Balkans (COWEB, 
CIVCOM) are now chaired by the EEAS. 
In the candidate and potential candidate countries, the enlargement process is the 
prime mover of EU policy and this seems to be respected by the EEAS. The unit 
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dealing with the Western Balkans in the EEAS is formed mainly by officials who dealt 
with CFSP issues in the Balkans under Javier Solana. DG Enlargement on the other 
hand covers the different chapters of the enlargement process and has significantly 
more resources dedicated to these countries than the EEAS. However, some of these 
countries, whether candidate countries such as Macedonia or potential candidate 
countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania or Kosovo still pose serious 
political challenges to the EU that require the involvement of the High Representative 
and the EEAS. Senior officials from the EEAS have been involved in trying to solve the 
political crises in Albania and Bosnia and the collaboration between DG Enlargement 
and the EEAS was generally described as “good”.21 During the referendum crisis in 
Bosnia, Catherine Ashton’s double-hatting proved especially valuable as she could use 
the different carrots offered by Commission instruments in her negotiations with the 
Bosnian Serb leaders. 
As the Western Balkans are still not crisis-free, a continuous dialogue between the two 
services is needed, in order to improve coordination and avoid duplication of work. 
This has been the case and is facilitated by the fact that Štefan Füle, the Commissioner 
responsible for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, is also closely 
working with the EEAS for the ENP part of his mandate.  
3.6 The EEAS and the European Neighbourhood Policy  
The collaboration of the EEAS and the Commission in the area of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is highly complex, follows a distinct logic and has 
functioned relatively well. As opposed to the other policy areas such as trade, 
migration, development cooperation and humanitarian aid that have specialised DGs 
within the Commission, there is no DG Neighbourhood. The Commissioner 
responsible for the Neighbourhood and his cabinet are the only Commission members 
that deal specifically with the ENP. The former DG Relex staff that worked, inter alia, 
on the ENP was transferred to the EEAS on 1 January 2011.  
                                                     
21 Interviews with DG Enlargement and EEAS officials, July-August 2011. 
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The EEAS currently has two Managing Directors dealing with the eastern and southern 
neighbourhoods and an ENP unit working on three horizontal issues in both 
neighbourhoods, namely the philosophy of the neighbourhood policy, the money 
backing up the policy and the regulatory affairs. In the area of the ENP, besides 
working with the Neighbourhood Commissioner, the EEAS has to collaborate on a 
constant basis with a number of Commission DGs, including the DG for Energy, DG 
Home Affairs, DG Trade and DG Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid 
(DEVCO).  
Having a Commissioner responsible for the European Neighbourhood Policy but 
without a DG has defined the EEAS’ relations with the Commission. The EEAS’ 
divisions dealing with the ENP became the de facto service of Commissioner Füle. 
Following the same logic, the Commissioner responsible for the ENP ‘works for’ the 
EEAS inside the walls of the Commission. The HR/VP intervenes in neighbourhood 
issues mostly when for instance there is a major crisis in one or more of the ENP 
countries. Day-to-day activities are conducted by the EEAS units concerned, under the 
leadership of Commissioner Füle.  
The Council decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the EEAS also facilitates cooperation 
between the Neighbourhood Commissioner and the HR/VP on the European 
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which is the current financial 
instrument for funding projects in the area. According to Art. 9 (5) of the Council 
decision, the proposals concerning the ENPI have to be “prepared jointly by the 
relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the responsibility of the 
Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood Policy and shall be submitted jointly 
with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission”.  
The Eastern Europe and Central Asia (COEST) and the Mashreq/Maghreb Working 
Parties (MaMa), composed of member state representatives working on the Eastern 
and Southern Neighbourhoods respectively, are the primary fora for the EEAS and 
member states’ interactions in the area of neighbourhood. The EEAS’ initiatives are 
stronger vis-à-vis the member state representatives in the cases when the preferences of 
the EEAS and the specific Commission DG involved converge in a given sector and vice 
versa. As interviews reveal, the EEAS for instance might go against the preference of 
THE NEW EU FOREIGN POLICY ARCHITECTURE AND THE EEAS | 47 
 
the Commission’s DG for Energy and even receive preliminary support from the 
member state representatives of COEST or MaMa concerning an energy-related issue 
within the neighbourhood. However, at the next stage, the member state diplomats in 
the Working Party on Energy with whom the DG for Energy works on a constant basis 
are likely to block the initiative citing energy reasons. The DG for Energy has an 
informational advantage in relation to the EEAS on the member states preferences in 
energy issues. Therefore, in order to table successful proposals in the energy sector 
within the framework of the ENP, the EEAS needs to cooperate with the Commission’s 
DG for Energy. 
Another complex area of cooperation is migration, particularly in the context of 
relations with the southern neighbourhood where the EEAS has to work with the 
Commission’s DG Home Affairs. DG Home Affairs is more in agreement with the 
representatives of the interior ministries of the member states than with the EEAS. The 
EEAS seeks to increase the mobility with the neighbourhood countries more than the 
Commission’s DG Home Affairs. However, the ability of the EEAS is rather limited not 
only by the disagreements with DG Home Affairs but also with the representatives 
from the national foreign ministries in the MaMa who are also influenced by interior 
ministries of their respective national governments. 
The Commission’s DG DEVCO collaborates with the EEAS on a regular basis 
facilitating yet another link between the Service and the Commission in the area of the 
ENP. In this specific policy area, the EEAS’ relations with DG DEVCO have been 
improving after the initial problems. In the post-Lisbon system, the EEAS takes a lead 
on programming the country allocations in the multiannual financial framework, 
country and regional strategic papers as well as national and regional indicative 
programmes. DG DEVCO leads the programming of the annual actions and their 
implementation (see above). The EEAS and DG DEVCO coordinate the ENPI funds 
together. The former works on the programming and the latter is responsible for the 
projects and the implementation. The debates are primarily about how much money 
has to be allocated to which neighbouring region or country.  
The opening of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) negotiations 
with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia is an example of the EEAS strength to influence 
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the member states when it is in agreement with the Commission. The DCFTAs with 
small neighbours are insignificant for the EU’s trade purposes but quite important for 
the EU’s foreign policy goals. Moreover, DG Trade viewed the partner countries as not 
ready to reform. These considerations made DG Trade reluctant to open the 
negotiations with the small eastern neighbours. However, after the initial opposition, 
the EEAS managed to convince DG Trade to seek a mandate from the member states to 
start the negotiations. Once the EEAS and the DG Trade were on the same page, the 
member states gave the green light to open the negotiations.  
For the upcoming seven-year (2014-2020) multiannual financial framework (MFF), the 
EEAS requested €18 billion for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).22 This 
sum is slightly higher than that allocated to the ENPI. The EEAS, although constrained 
by the Commission DGs’ preferences and the decision-making rights of the member 
states, is likely to continue pushing the countries of both neighbourhoods to do their 
homework and implement real reforms.  
In sum, the institutional set-up of having the EEAS working with the Commissioner 
responsible Neighbourhood functions well. After DG Relex’s transfer to the EEAS, no 
parallel structure was set up in the Commission. Thus, the duplication of resources was 
avoided. The EEAS’ units working on the ENP collaborated well with Commissioner 
Füle, and the Commissioner became the ally of the EEAS inside the Commission. 
Having the Commission involved in the ENP is also logical, since the neighbourhood 
policy has many features that are in line with the EU’s internal policies rather than 
external action as such. The HR/VP came into play only in cases when there was a 
major crisis with a neighbourhood county. Therefore, the current structure does not 
need to be changed drastically but could serve as a model to deputise the HR/VP by a 
Commissioner. However, the coordination between the EEAS and a number of 
Commission DGs could be improved. 
                                                     
22 The ENI is set to replace the ENPI in the upcoming MFF. As opposed to the ENPI, Russia is 
not a beneficiary of the ENI. See “The Multiannual Financial Framework: The Proposals on 
External Action Instruments” (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-878_en.htm? 
locale=en). 
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Recommendation 
The EEAS’ relations with the Commission DGs will largely benefit from more 
flexible rotation procedures across the institutions. The leadership within the EEAS 
and the Commission should work towards constructing an environment where 
moving from the Commission to the EEAS or vice versa is viewed in a positive light. 
3.7 Service for Foreign Policy Instruments 
The Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) is a new Commission department that 
manages the CFSP budget, the Instrument for Stability (IfS) and other actions such as 
elections observation under the authority of the HR/VP in her capacity as Vice-
President of the Commission. This new service was created inside the Commission as it 
is the Commission – not the EEAS – that manages the operational budget of the Union. 
The FPI has also been co-located within the new EEAS headquarters. 
Part of the personnel that was transferred to the FPI constituted an object of contention 
for the European Parliament, the EEAS and the Commission. The Commission was 
accused of not transferring all the necessary IfS personnel to the EEAS. On 29 October 
2010, the Parliamentary rapporteurs on the EEAS (MEPs Brok, Gualtieri and 
Verhofstadt) sent a letter to Commission President Barroso explaining that under the 
Madrid agreement the High Representative should commit herself to “integrating 
current Commission (Instrument for Stability) planners into the EEAS, side by side 
with the Council’s CSDP structures, both under her direct authority. The Commission 
supported this and it formed an integral part of the agreement found in Madrid on 21 
June.” The three MEPs accused the Commission of acting “contrary to the letter and 
the spirit of the Madrid agreement” by putting in a budget amendment “that foresaw 
only a very limited transfer of IfS-Personnel to the EAS”. In response, the Commission 
(FPI) argued that it needs these people to implement the IfS and that the EEAS should 
transfer some of its own staff to those peace-building units that need them. These kinds 
of disagreements are indicative of the difficult start of the EEAS. While there are voices 
calling for the integration of the FPI within the EEAS, this would be complicated from 
a legal point of view while, at the same time, the Service for Foreign Policy 
Instruments, in its current setting, has the potential to be one of the institutional links 
that keeps the Commission and the EEAS constructively engaged with one another. 
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4. RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT AND THE QUEST FOR POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
uring the setting-up of the EEAS, the European Parliament aimed to ensure that 
the new service and its actors would be politically accountable to the only 
directly elected institution of the EU. As the EEAS and the HR/VP took over tasks of 
the Council Secretariat and the rotating Presidency, the relations regarding 
information-sharing and reporting that partly rested on interinstitutional agreements23 
had to be put on a new basis. In addition, the new powers of the Parliament in the area 
of international agreements24 triggered the need for more extensive forms of 
cooperation. 
By threatening to block under co-decision rules the decision on budget and staffing of 
the EEAS, the European Parliament succeeded to obtain a de facto co-decision power 
on the Council decision on the EEAS.25 The European Parliament actively used the 
‘quadrilogue’ with the Commission, Council and the HR/VP on the design of the 
EEAS to carve out a new foundation for political accountability: declarations on 
                                                     
23 Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council concerning 
access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the field of 
security and defence policy, 2002 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2002:298:0001:0003:EN:PDF); Interinstitutional agreement between the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and sound financial 
management, 2006 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:139: 
0003:0003:EN: PDF); Framework Agreement on relations between the European Parliament and 
the European Commission, 2010 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= 
OJ:C:2006:139:0003:0003). 
24 Art. 218 TFEU. 
25 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service, 2010 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:201: 
0030:0040:EN:PDF). 
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political accountability and on the basic organisation of the EEAS’ central 
administration by the High Representative are the reference documents for the 
cooperation of the foreign policy executive with the Parliament.26 While the declaration 
gives broad guidelines on consultation, information and reporting engagements of the 
HR/VP and the EEAS, it still leaves many questions open. 
Our interviews revealed that MEPs from the main political groups of the Parliament 
are in general satisfied with the setting-up process and the performance of the EEAS. 
Being aware of the challenges the EEAS has to face, they regard the service as an 
important institutional innovation. While differences of opinion on the substance of 
policy surface during debates, the interviewed MEPs value the degree of their 
cooperation with the HR/VP and the EEAS. The embrace of the new service might be 
surprising at first sight, but MEPs have their reasons to side with the new player in 
town: the HR/VP and the EEAS in the future might turn out to be important vehicles 
and partners through which to increase the participation of the European Parliament in 
the EU’s external action. 
4.1 The HR/VP’s presence in the Parliament and the question of deputies 
By merging the tasks of the High Representative, the RELEX Commissioner and the 
rotating Presidency, the HR/VP is left as one of the main interlocutors for the 
European Parliament.27 This in turn decreased the number of visits to the EP of high-
level foreign policy executives (see Box 1) and led to the dissatisfaction of some MEPs. 
However, this also gives the European Parliament the chance to have the HR/VP and 
the EEAS as a single interlocutor on a long-term basis. 
 
 
                                                     
26 See http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2010-0280 
&language=EN 
27 However, the current Commission also comprises a Commissioner for neighbourhood policy, 
which was previously part of the RELEX Commissioner portfolio (see chapter on the 
Commission relations in this study). 
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Box 1. The High Representative in the European Parliament 
The Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) faces a reduction of high-level visitors from 
the foreign policy executive. In the legislative term 2004-2009, High Representative 
Solana visited AFET ten times, RELEX Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 15 times and the 
foreign minister of the rotating Presidency 19 times.28 This total of 44 high-level visits can 
hardly be met by the post-Lisbon High Representative and Catherine Ashton is not 
intending to do so. Generally it has been agreed with Parliament that she will be present 
two times a year, which equals the frequency of Solana’s meeting with AFET. For the 
debriefing of the Foreign Affairs Council, a system for deputising the foreign policy chief 
has to be found (see below). 
However, the plenary is more frequently visited by the HR/VP. While the foreign 
minister of the Presidency visited Strasbourg only once or twice per term, it is agreed 
that the HR/VP will speak to plenary six times a year, of which two sessions have a 
special question hour. She also insists that at least one member of the EEAS corporate 
board and two managing directors of the EEAS accompany her in Strasbourg.  
The unsettled question who debriefs the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) about 
the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) reveals the challenges of 
implementing the new system of representation in the Parliament. In 2010 the system 
of debriefing had teething problems: from the 11 regular FAC meetings,29 the first was 
debriefed by the Presidency, one was debriefed by Robert Cooper, a high-ranking 
official from the General Secretariat of the Council and two were debriefed by 
Catherine Ashton in the scope of her regular exchanges with AFET. Seven of the FAC 
meetings were not debriefed.  
In theory, there are three different options of representing the HR/VP in the 
committee: a commissioner, the foreign minister of the rotating Presidency or a 
representative of the EEAS. In 2011 the first option was tested; thus except for one 
meeting debriefed by Ashton, all other meetings in the first half of the year were 
                                                     
28 Ibid. 
29 Excluding extraordinary meetings and meetings on trade. 
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debriefed by Commissioner Füle for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy. Since a 
Commissioner has no competences in the area of CFSP, this led to a rather unusual 
approach and put him in a position in which he is questioned by MEPs on the outcome 
of Foreign Affairs Council meetings even though he had no influence on many areas of 
the discussions, such as CFSP. Thus, this modus of debriefing did not continue. 
Since the second half of 2011, the foreign ministers of the rotating presidencies 
debriefed the ministerial meetings for the MEPs, although quite sporadically. Already 
the experience from the pre-Lisbon period shows that only six of 33 debriefings in the 
last legislative session were held by foreign ministers, the large majority (82%) being 
held by state secretaries or ministers for European affairs.30 The limited availability of 
foreign ministers of the rotating Presidency shows that a comeback of the rotating 
Presidency in this function might be suboptimal. Especially the advantage envisaged 
with the Lisbon Treaty of having one permanent interlocutor would be lost. 
Furthermore, the rotating Presidency is no longer in charge of planning the FAC 
agenda. 
Interviewees from the EP and the EEAS suggested that an interlocutor for AFET 
should come from within the structure of the EEAS. An ideal choice would be the 
Secretary-General of the EEAS, as the post-holder knows developments of the EEAS 
from the inside and is also present in meetings of foreign ministers. The current holder 
of the post, Pierre Vimont, already participates in the debriefings in AFET, and the 
benefit of having this linchpin-post as an interlocutor is also acknowledged by MEPs. 
But also the Political Affairs Department of the service, including the chair of the PSC 
and its Political Director Helga Schmid, would be a natural interlocutor for the MEPs. 
The only flaw for any EEAS representative is that he/she is not ‘politically 
accountable’. For instance the Secretary General of the EEAS is not mandated by the 
Council, but has been nominated ‘only’ by the High Representative. An effective 
                                                     
30 Calculation based on Committee on Foreign Affairs activity report for the 6th legislature 2004-
2009 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/200905/20090505ATT55147/2009
0505ATT55147EN.pdf). 
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solution would be an agreement between the Council and the European Parliament 
that an EEAS representative is mandated by the foreign ministers to report on their 
meetings under the political responsibility of the HR/VP. 
Recommendation 
The new HR/VP and the EEAS offer the European Parliament the advantage of 
having one interlocutor for the democratic oversight of the EU’s external action. To 
make full use of this advantage, it has to avoid a ‘comeback of the old pillar 
structure’ when it comes to the representation of the HR/VP. As a consequence, an 
EEAS representative, such as the Secretary-General of the EEAS, could represent the 
HR/VP for the debriefings on the Council meetings of the foreign ministers in the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Parliament instead of the rotating Presidency or 
a Commissioner. 
The commitment of the High Representative towards the European Parliament 
regarding the plenary is high. Rather than evaluating her six appearances per year as 
purely a matter of duty, the meetings should be used by the High Representative to 
gather support for her positions and as a public stage to present and promote them. In 
general, the High Representative can rely on the support of the majority of the house, 
whenever she speaks out for a strong and unified EU position, going beyond the 
lowest common denominator of disagreeing member states. As an example, Ashton’s 
effort to facilitate a dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia was backed by the European 
Parliament, which in a resolution underlined the importance of the recognition of 
Kosovo by all member states.31 Nevertheless, positions of the High Representative and 
the MEPs can also clash, as was the case at the plenary session on 9 March 2011. During 
the discussions on the crisis in Libya, several MEPs spoke in favour of military options 
in the form of a no-fly-zone. MEPs also invited representatives of the National 
                                                     
31 The EP’s vote on this issue lined up along member state lines, with MEPs from the countries 
that did not recognise Kosovo (Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain) to a large degree 
opposing the adopted text. See also the breakdown of the vote by votewatch 
(http://www.votewatch.eu/cx_vote_details.php?id_act=854&lang=en). 
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Transitional Council from Benghazi to Strasbourg. However, Catherine Ashton did not 
take a strong position on a military intervention nor did she recognise or even publicly 
meet the National Transitional Council. In the view of some MEPs, this projected a 
picture of an HR/VP waiting for the member states to find their positions, rather than 
an HR/VP who takes the initiative, secures the support by the European Parliament 
and finds a strong compromise with the member states.  
Recommendation 
The European Parliament in its majority demands a strong and coherent EU foreign 
policy. This can be used by the HR/VP to seek the support of the European 
Parliament for its own positions and proposals. The HR/VP should use the plenary 
sessions of the Parliament not only as a forum to present ideas to MEPs, but also to 
win the public for EU foreign policy initiatives. 
The clear interests of the MEPs in a strong EEAS became once again clear, during the 
European Parliament’s debate and report on the yearly performance of CFSP in August 
2012. In their reaction to the annual report presented by the High Representative, the 
MEPs called for a strengthening of the EEAS, the definition of strategic priorities as 
well as the realisation of the comprehensive approach that ties different external tools 
and policies of the EU together.32 This is also a surprising development, as it represents 
a strategic change of the MEPs. During the set-up of the EEAS, the primary focus of the 
European Parliament was to create a service that was not independent, but rather was 
tied to the Commission in order to strengthen the ‘supranational aspect’ of foreign 
policy. The more pragmatic approach taken by the European Parliament now is to 
strengthen the EEAS as a strong player in its own right, while ensuring oversight 
possibilities. The constructive and supportive approach by the MEPs should be used 
for those who want to make comprehensive changes in the EEAS review possible.  
                                                     
32 Report on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-
0252&language=EN). 
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4.2 Day-to-day contacts 
The importance of having close contacts with the European Parliament is recognised 
within the EEAS. The High Representative as well as the Secretary-General of the 
EEAS have pronounced the importance they attach to engagement with the MEPs and 
parliamentary delegations to third countries. Frequently taking part in delegations’ 
preparatory meetings, for example, can prevent the policy objectives of the two bodies 
from working against each other. Before the Lisbon Treaty came into effect, the 
General-Secretariat of the Council followed the practice of interacting with 
parliamentary delegations only on the level of directors and above, but DG RELEX also 
sent desk officers to the delegation meetings. As a positive development, the EEAS has 
chosen the later approach and opened up its structures to the European Parliament on 
all levels: not only directors but also desk officers from the EEAS frequently take part 
in meetings of the parliamentary delegations. In the AFET Committee, managing 
directors are regularly present for exchanges of views and the EEAS director for 
relations with the European Parliament is present at almost every committee meeting. 
These day-to-day contacts are especially valuable for the European Parliament, as they 
further increase the Parliament’s expertise in foreign policy. Knowledge and 
understanding of policy processes is essential for the MEPs to play a greater role in a 
policy area, such as the CFSP, in which their formal participation roles are limited. 
4.3 Exchange of views with the heads of delegations 
The possibility to have an exchange of views with the newly appointed heads of EU 
delegations as well as EU special representatives was a central request of the European 
Parliament during the negotiations on the EEAS. The declaration on political 
accountability foresees that the HR/VP has to respond positively to a request of the 
Parliament to meet a new EU ambassador. After each round of appointments, each 
parliamentary group can name up to four new heads of delegation that they would like 
to invite and the coordinators of AFET further reduce the number and compile a list 
which is then sent to the HR/VP. Between the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the end of the 2012 parliamentary summer break, 97 heads of delegation and EU 
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special representatives were appointed,33 of whom 31 were invited to an exchange of 
views in AFET. 
Even though less than a third of the appointees were actually called to AFET, this is 
still in line with what the Parliament wanted to achieve. Rather than having US-style 
congressional hearings to vet all appointments, the majority of MEPs only want to see 
‘strategically important’ EU ambassadors. The exchange of views takes place after their 
appointment by the High Representative, but ideally before they start working in their 
host country. According to the interviewed MEPs, a system in which every single head 
of delegation appears in Parliament would overstretch their resources and could cause 
delays in the process of filling the posts. Problematic is also the low attendance rate of 
MEPs at some of these meetings. This is in contrast with the MEPs’ initial demands for 
political accountability. Whilst some regions discussed in these exchanges are only of 
interest to particular MEPs, minimum standards of preparation and participation have 
to be met in order to make these exchanges a useful exercise. Furthermore, if the aim is 
to have a maximum of democratic oversight, MEPs should aspire to review a majority 
of the ambassadorial appointments. The fact that not even every one-third of the 
appointments is controlled by the MEPs raises the question if this aim is being 
achieved.  
Even though the head of delegation has already been appointed by the time he/she 
appears in front of the Committee, the European Parliament cannot be ignored in the 
nomination process. Some of the heads of delegation had to deal with very difficult 
questions, such as the new head of delegation to Brazil. However, thus far none of the 
appointees has been judged as unsuitable for the job. In the case of an unqualified or 
controversial candidate, however, the pressure on the HR/VP to address this issue 
could mount quickly. After the exchange, an evaluation is drafted by the AFET 
Secretariat and sent to the political parties before it is submitted to the HR/VP. Whilst 
                                                     
33 Including the last appointment by the European Commission on 17 February 2010, of Joao 
Vale de Almeida as Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United States by 
Commission President Barroso, which sparked a controversy as it came in the midst of the 
process of consultation over future practises of nominating these posts.  
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the document as such is confidential and MEPs are compelled to refrain from sharing 
the contents of the meetings, it is likely that a negative assessment would eventually go 
public. Legally speaking, it is still the HR/VP taking the decision, but in order to avoid 
‘rough relations’ with Parliament, the High Representative would probably withdraw 
the appointment or ask the respective person to step down. In the end, the HR/VP has 
to anticipate the evaluation of the Parliament before the nomination and only give 
serious consideration to experienced and acceptable candidates.  
The exchange of views is not just about democratic oversight of the appointment. The 
establishment of contacts between the head of delegation and MEPs and EP staff is at 
least as essential. As an example, heads of delegations do not come to the Parliament 
just for the exchange, but meet with the coordinators of AFET beforehand. A good 
working relationship between the MEPs and the heads of delegation is valuable for 
both sides: the heads of delegation need the support of the Parliament for specific 
policies and the MEPs need information from the delegations in order to make valid 
assessments. Furthermore, the European Parliament has to draw on the support of the 
Union delegations when acting abroad. National diplomats appointed as heads of 
delegation are generally less familiar with the cooperation with the European 
Parliament on the ground. In these cases a visit to the Parliament can ensure smoother 
relations between the EU delegations and MEPs. To further expand the contacts 
between MEPs and the EU delegations, the EEAS informs the secretariat of the 
European Parliament of every visit of a head of delegation to Brussels. The secretariat 
then arranges contacts with the AFET chair, delegation chairs or respective 
rapporteurs.  
The question whether the exchanges of views with heads of delegations should take 
place in public or in camera triggered a strong controversy between the HR/VP and the 
European Parliament in late 2010. While the in-camera setting of the exchanges of 
views is currently not disputed by the Parliament, one could reconsider opening up 
meetings to the public. An argument for that is an increased visibility and transparency 
of EU foreign policy. Already now, hardly any information discussed in these meetings 
can be labelled as confidential: the heads of delegation have not yet started to work in 
the field, which limits their knowledge of sensitive information. Heads of delegation 
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can even be hesitant to share information with MEPs (and the assistants in the room) in 
an in-camera setting and would prefer smaller meetings (like the meeting with the 
AFET coordinators) to speak about sensitive issues. At present, however, both sides – 
the EEAS and the European Parliament –appreciate that in camera meetings allow for a 
frank exchange. Having journalists and host country officials in the room limits the 
possibility to touch upon sensitive issues, especially in cases where human rights 
issues are under discussion.  
4.4 Sharing confidential information 
In the area of CSDP, a special committee of five MEPs (see Box 2) is an important 
forum to exercise the scrutiny rights of the European Parliament. In the end of the 
mandate of High Representative Solana, exchanges between him and the special 
committee were held usually four times a year. With the new HR/VP and also new 
parliamentarians who needed security clearance, the system had to be reactivated. 
Several meetings have taken place so far and the MEPs have been informed by 
Catherine Ashton herself and Pierre Vimont, Executive Secretary General of the EEAS. 
The fact that the High Representative could not be present at an occasion, but was 
represented by her Secretary General caused some discontent among the MEPs, not 
because of the quality of the exchange, but because of the repeated demand of the 
European Parliament to interact with politically accountable interlocutors. Whilst the 
benefit of these meetings is to have a frank exchange on foreign policy with the 
possibility of the High Representative to speak openly to the MEPs, the shared 
information apparently does not always justify its confidential classification.34  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
34 As remarked by an official in an interview.  
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Box 2. The special committee for CSDP oversight 
The system of a special committee dates back to the Inter-institutional agreement 
between the European Parliament and the Council from 200235 and will be part of the 
update of the agreement in early 2013: A group of five MEPs with security clearances 
will be granted access to confidential documents on the Council’s premises and they will 
be informed by the High Representative on sensitive issues that he/she cannot share in a 
wider setting like AFET or the plenary. The group includes the chair of AFET, two EPP 
and two S&D MEPs. One MEP of ALDE serves as a substitute in case one of the 
members is absent. Because of the limited number of members of this committee, not all 
political groups are represented. 
Confidential information is now also supposed to be shared with ‘office holders’, 
especially rapporteurs. This is in line with the increased powers of the European 
Parliament in the area of international agreements. The Commission already agreed 
that access to confidential information could be granted to the respective rapporteurs, 
particularly in areas in which the consent of the European Parliament is required.36 In 
addition, the High Representative repeated in the declaration on political 
accountability that parliament will be immediately and fully informed at all stages on 
negotiations of international agreements like required by Article 2018 TFEU.37 The 
declaration on political accountability also covers the area of CFSP and foresees that 
the High Representative gives access to CFSP documents on a ‘need-to-know’ basis to 
MEPs who require those documents to perform their ‘institutional function’.38  
                                                     
35 Art. 3.3, Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament and the Council 
concerning access by the European Parliament to sensitive information of the Council in the 
field of security and defence policy, 2002 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:298:0001:0003:EN:PDF). 
36 Framework agreement between the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
2010 Annex II, Point 3.2.1. (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:304:0047:0062:EN:PDF). 
37 Art. 218 (10) TFEU; Declaration of the High Representative on political accountability, point 2. 
38 Declaration of the High Representative on political accountability, point 4. 
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Consequently, the possibility to grant access to sensitive information in the area of 
CFSP to inter alia rapporteurs and committee chairs is part of the updated inter-
institutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the High 
Representative, which is being concluded in early 2013. However, the decision of 
whether access is granted still rests with the Council and the High Representative. 
Information marked as ‘top-secret’ will in any case not be forwarded to the European 
Parliament premises.  
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5. THE EEAS ABROAD: COORDINATION AND 
COOPERATION BETWEEN EU DELEGATIONS 
ith the establishment of the EEAS, all Commission delegations on the ground 
were transformed into EU delegations. Overnight they were no longer 
representing the Commission, but the EU as a whole, including on matters of CFSP. 
They embody the heart of the EU representation around the world, but would remain 
toothless, if they wouldn’t be able to cooperate with the other big players of EU 
external action: the member states with their own established embassy networks 
around the world of over 3,000 missions and the European Commission, which is 
managing the important international dossiers (such as trade, development and 
enlargement).  
The EU’s external representation 
Establishing the EU delegations alongside the existing representations of the member 
states awakened the old debate about the delimitation of competences between the EU 
and national level. When is the EU level allowed to represent or coordinate the 
positions of the member states?  
If not on cultural affairs and consular protection, EU delegations to third countries 
progressively took over the lead and assumed the coordination function previously 
fulfilled by the rotating Presidency. With the same reasoning that underlies the setting-
up of permanent chairs in the FAC working groups in Brussels, the aim was to achieve 
more continuity. The ‘more political’ role of the EU delegations enables them to 
represent EU statements and demarches and to permanently chair EU internal 
coordination meetings with the member states’ national embassies. The enhanced 
W
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political role of EU delegations was introduced gradually, given considerations of the 
member states and other technical issues.39 An important factor was the reinforcement 
of the political sections, which are still being built up in many EU delegations.40 Where 
it is effectively in place, the EEAS-led coordination has been working well in general 
and the “[o]verall assessment of the EEAS on the ground […] reveals that the EU has 
since the creation of the EEAS gained more visibility and enhanced its impact in the 
majority of host countries”.41  
Not only for the coordination of the EU position, but also for the support of visits of 
foreign ministers or MEP delegations, the EEAS delegations provide more and more 
added value. A recent positive example is a visit by the Swedish, Polish and Bulgarian 
foreign ministers to the countries of the South Caucasus in early December 2012. 
Afterwards the ministers thanked the High Representative in a letter for the support 
and preparation of the trip. The local head of delegation was participating in all 
meetings. 
However, the international presence of the Union is not yet completely ensured by the 
new service and the role of the Commission and the member states is not completely 
substituted. In a number of countries around the world, the coordination and 
representation functioning is still assumed by the member state holding the rotating 
Presidency or other member states present on the ground, mostly because the EEAS is 
not present with a delegation on the ground itself.42 
While, bilateral representation is in general acknowledged as successful, representation 
of the EU at multilateral organisations faces more challenges. The EU treaties now state 
that “Union delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall 
                                                     
39 See Andrew Rettman, EU commission 'embassies' granted new powers“, EU Observer 21 
January 2010 (http://euobserver.com/foreign/29308). 
40 In the end of 2011, more than 20 EU delegations did not have a political section, see Report by 
the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission 22nd 
December 2011 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/images/top_stories/2011_eeas_report_cor_+_formatting.pdf). 
41 Internal assessment paper of a member state. 
42 See EEAS, “EU diplomatic representation in third countries − Second half of 2012“, 11522/12, 
15 June 2012, Brussels.  
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represent the Union”.43 The problems, however, are numerous.44 Among them is the 
basic fact that the EU is not a state and as such is not (nor can it be) a full party to many 
international organisations. While the EU with the Lisbon Treaty acquired legal 
personality (Art.  47 TEU), its member states still have to agree on the cases where the 
EU can speak on their behalf. A simplified interpretation of the treaties would be that 
regardless of the delimitation of competences in the treaty, the EU delegations have the 
right to act on behalf of the member states. This is far from the post-Lisbon reality. 
Some member states see the enhanced status of EU delegation in international 
organisations as problematic and the UK government send around notes to its national 
embassies warning of a ‘competence creep’ of the EEAS. In the second half of 2011, the 
question of who is entitled to represent the EU caused major disruptions in the EU’s 
representation in international organisations, as many statements and demarches were 
blocked. As a rejection to this unsolved issue, the Council agreed on arrangements for 
EU statements in multilateral organisations.45 Legal commentators, however, are very 
sceptical about the diplomatic and legal consequences of this document, as it grants the 
right to speak to member states even in cases where the established interpretation of 
shared competences and the duty of cooperation give the EU the right to act 
internationally.46 Equally cautious is the assessment of the High Representative in the 
report to the European Parliament on this issue, stating that “it is to be hoped that the 
recent [arrangements for EU statements] can lead to a more visible and active EU 
presence in future”.  
Another point of discussion concerns the role of EU delegations as consular services. A 
dividing line goes through the member states, with some of them expressing a strong 
wish that EU delegations can help EU citizens abroad in consular affairs, while others 
                                                     
43 Art. 221 TFEU 
44 For more on the issue, see Michael Emerson et al. (2011) and Piotr Maciej Kaczyński (Helsinki, 
2011) 
45 See Council of the European Union, “EU Statements in multilateral organisations - General 
Arrangements”, 15901/11,  24 October 2011, Brussels. 
46 Ramses A. Wessel and Bart van Vooren, “The EEAS’ Diplomatic Dreams and the Reality of 
European and International Law”, paper presented at the UACES Conference Exchanging Ideas 
on Europe 2012, Old Borders – New Frontiers, 3-5 September 2012, Passau. 
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are strictly opposed to the idea of the EU becoming active in this national competence. 
The EEAS decision states that EU delegations can support member states in their role 
of providing consular protection of EU citizens on a resource neutral basis. Given the 
limited capacities and expertise of EU delegations in this area, however, further 
development of EEAS run consular affairs would need the  consent of the member 
states to politically and financially support the EU delegations in establishing the 
necessary resources. However, the lack of political will in some member states makes 
further steps towards this end in the upcoming EEAS review highly questionable. 
In many instances a common representation is facing challenges, but a successful 
example of cooperation between the member states and the EEAS could be witnessed 
in Syria in early 2012. While it was politically necessary for some member states to 
close down embassies in conflict-torn Syria, they did not want to give up all presence 
on the ground. As a consequence, so-called ‘lap-top diplomats’ from Spain, Italy and 
Belgium were stationed at the EU delegation in Damascus. Given the increasing 
austerity measures in member states, ‘lap-top diplomats’ could be a way forward for 
member states to pool and share their representation in some places in the world. 
Information-sharing with member states  
With the creation of a common service, especially the small and middle-sized member 
states hoped for an increase of shared information. A shared and comprehensive pool 
of information is seen as the ideal basis on which a one-voice European foreign policy 
can be developed. To the discontent of some member states, the sharing of information 
faces several challenges.  
Technically, in most third countries, the EU does not possess a secure system of 
communication to exchange classified documents locally between the national 
embassies and the Union delegations. Currently, pilot projects are running to install 
such communication systems. For example in Washington, D.C., EU delegations and 
member state delegations on the ground can share their reporting through a website 
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interface.47 Sharing reports locally is seen as the most effective way, as it provides 
member states and the EEAS with the information where they need it.48 However, the 
development of such systems takes time and can only gradually be implemented 
within the current budget lines of the EEAS. 
Apart from technical limitations, the sharing of information still suffers from a rather 
unstructured and ad-hoc nature of reporting. As a consequence, the quality and 
quantity of reports varies from delegation to delegation.49 This problem is even 
accentuated as delegations often ask the geographical desks in the headquarters in 
Brussels for permission to share reports, which is not based on a legal requirement and 
in many cases causes significant delays. While time passes, ambassadors from member 
states with less diplomatic and information capabilities learn informally about certain 
developments from their colleagues with a better access to information (sometimes 
from within the EEAS).50 This causes displeasure and decreases the feeling of 
‘ownership’ among those member states that argue that the default position of the 
EEAS should be to share all information with all member states. 
The EU delegations are also sometimes accused of ‘cleaning’ the information before 
sending it to the member states. In order to be able to gather information and to act 
independently from the member states, EU delegations sometimes have to conceal 
their sources and the information they received. Some contacts might refuse to disclose 
information, knowing that it will be in the hands of all 27 member states in a short 
period of time, including the contacts’ identity. If member states want to have a 
stronger EU presence on the ground, they have to accept that delegations will not be 
able to share all information with all member states every time. A balanced trade-off 
that allows for a strong EU representation on the ground securing its information, 
                                                     
47 Bart van Vooren and Ramses A. Wessel, “External Representation and the European External 
Action Service: Selected Legal Challenges”, CLEER Working Paper 2012/5, Centre for the Law 
of EU External Relations, Asser Institute, Den Hague. 
48 Interview in Brussels.  
49 Bicchi, Federica, “The European external action service: A pivotal actor in EU foreign policy 
communications?”, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 7 (1), 2012, pp. 81-94. 
50 Interview in Brussels. 
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while not risking the feeling of ownership of the service by the member states, has to 
be found. 
Information exchange, however, is not a one-way street. Currently the information 
handed over by member states’ embassies to EU delegations is limited. While the first 
proposal of the Council on the setup of the EEAS explicitly mentioned that Union 
delegations “shall on a reciprocal basis, provide all relevant information”51, this 
sentence was dropped in the final EEAS decision. EEAS officials and also some 
member states stress the importance of reciprocal information-sharing to allow for a 
coordinated and vertical coherent EU foreign policy.52 However, mutual transparency 
depends on trust, which can only be established in the long-term by gradual 
cooperation. 
Cooperation EU Delegations – Commission Services 
Next to the cooperation with the member states, EU delegations work on a daily basis 
with the Commission services. Because the management of EU operational funds is 
done by the Commission and not the EEAS, most EU delegations also comprise 
Commission staff. The process of transforming the former Commission delegations 
into EU delegations and integrating the EEAS and Commission staff has gone fairly 
smoothly, partially because the rotation of personnel in the delegations is done 
gradually. However, the process is not accident-free and a few challenges remain to be 
addressed.  
Most of the Commission staff in EU delegations comes from DG DEVCO while in 
candidate countries and potential candidate countries, the monitoring of pre-accession 
preparations and implementation of assistance is done by DG Enlargement staff. Both 
the EEAS and the Commission staff in the delegations are put under the authority of 
the head of delegation that comes from the EEAS. Normally, this should not raise too 
                                                     
51 Art. 5(9), Proposal for a Council Decision of (date) establishing the organisation and 
functioning of the European External Action Service, 25 March 2010 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/eeas_draft_decision_250310_en.pdf). 
52 Based on interviews in Brussels. 
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many problems: the situation is similar to the one found in many member states’ 
embassies where staff from different line ministries work alongside diplomats. 
However, the heads of delegations do not have the same leverage as national 
ambassadors. The supervisors of the Commission employees in the delegations are 
located in Brussels – not in the delegations and this can potentially influences their 
loyalties. Both the High Representative/EEAS and the Commission issue instructions 
to the delegation and both benefit from the reporting done by them. Top down, when 
the Commission issues instructions to delegations, it has to provide a copy to the head 
of delegation and to the EEAS central administration. Bottom-up in the delegations, 
both categories of personnel (Commission, EEAS) have to copy the head of delegation 
in their communication with their respective headquarters.  
Having two categories of staff in the delegations poses challenges when the issue of 
replacement appears. Only the head of delegation (HoD) is double-hatted and has – 
besides his or her EEAS hat – sub-delegated implementation powers for European 
Commission-run projects. If the head of delegation is not available, the chargé 
d'affaires (who is often the head of the political section and, thus, belongs to the EEAS) 
does not have these powers and is not able to sign for any payments.  
Recommendation  
One possible solution for assuring a replacement for the HoD, at least in some 
capitals, would be to increase the use of a head of operations who would be able to 
replace the head of delegation.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
he first two years of the EEAS present a mixed, but generally positive, picture. 
‘Teething problems’ should not come as a surprise to anyone, given the 
complexity of setting up a new institution of this kind. Internally, the service had to 
find the right structures to deal with the different policy fields it touches on, ranging 
from traditional diplomacy, to crisis management, to the programming of external 
financial instruments. In relation to the other actors in the EU foreign policy 
machinery, the new player in town had to set up efficient working relations. This study 
highlights that the solutions to internal as well as external challenges go hand in hand, 
as the service’s success heavily depends on the functioning of its relations with its 
partners in Brussels and abroad. 
Our analysis of the relations of the EEAS with member state representatives, with the 
different Commission structures and with the European Parliament, reveals that close, 
structured and open contacts with its partners are indispensable for the service. In 
cases where the communication is working well, the service and its partners bring 
added value to EU’s external action. Cooperation with the EEAS is valued on the 
working group level in the Council, in the Committee on foreign affairs in the 
European Parliament and in the relations with certain Commission portfolios, such as 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. If, however, the service does not engage properly 
with its counterparts, problems arise. The report identified that challenges in 
cooperation emerge especially on the top hierarchical level of the Commission and 
with Commission services that view themselves as ‘non-political’, such as 
humanitarian aid. Coordination of the High Representative with the other top EU 
posts – the President of the European Commission and the European Council – can 
certainly be improved. However, the undefined relations with the rotating Presidency 
turned out to work out quite well, with effective coordination of activities on various 
levels.  
T
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The 2013 review of the EEAS can be used to address shortcomings of the current set-up 
in practical ways. The key is to realise the full potential of having a central 
administration dealing with foreign policy. The main opportunity is that it represents a 
single and permanent interlocutor for its partners inside and outside of the EU – for 
international partners, EU member states as well as EU institutions. To make use of 
this opportunity, the review should fully address the procedures and working relations 
of the EEAS. An enhanced coordination role of the HR/VP in the Commission, better 
information-sharing between EU delegations and national embassies abroad, and 
central reporting of the EEAS to the European Parliament and its committees are a few 
of the recommendations made in this report. It is likely that the EEAS review will lead 
to changes to the EEAS Council decision from 2009 and possibly to the Commission 
rules of procedures and portfolios for the 2014 Commission mandate. The review and 
following reforms represent an excellent opportunity to address the shortcomings in 
the EEAS’ relations with its partners. 
The review comes at a challenging time for Europe and its foreign policy ambitions. 
The financial and economic crisis in Europe is still the main battle and point of interest 
for the EU leaders and institutions. The development of the foreign policy of the Union 
does not generally rank high on their agenda. The EU’s attractiveness and influence in 
the world will depend on how it manages to tackle its internal crisis but also on the 
coherence of its external action. Indications of the UK partially retreating from 
common policies, the formation of a ‘core Europe’ and other navel-gazing exercises 
might consume too much of Europe’s energy. However, the reality ‘out there’ and the 
shifts in the international tectonic plates such as the rise of China and the strategic turn 
of the US away from Europe towards the Pacific area, should keep EU’s attention 
focused. It is clear that institutional adjustments cannot alter the difficult conditions EU 
foreign policy has to face. However, the opportunity of the review should be used to 
underline the added value that common foreign policy-making can bring – both in 
strengthening the EU’s international weight and in realising budget savings for the 
member states in times of austerity. That in turn might reactivate the political will – 
currently lacking in some of the member states – to make a stronger EU foreign policy 
possible. 
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The upcoming EEAS review is not the only debate on EU foreign policy in 2013. After 
the CSDP has lost its momentum, some member states are interested in reviving the 
debate on common defence, on issues such as pooling & sharing of capabilities or the 
coordination of national reforms in this sector. The heads of state or government have 
scheduled a debate on common defence issues in December 2013. Furthermore, the 
debate on strategies and priorities of EU foreign policy is going to continue, although 
likely without reaching a concrete outcome in the short term. However, Italy, Sweden, 
Poland and Spain will present a think-tank report on possible elements of a European 
Global Strategy in May 2013. In addition, the High Representative underlines the 
adoption of a comprehensive approach to crisis management as one of the possible 
success stories of her term. If the goal is to improve the EU’s international role, these 
elements have to be seen as interdependent and be addressed in a comprehensive 
manner.  
This report has outlined how the EEAS can improve the coordination with its partners 
in Brussels and in the member state. Strengthening the role of the EEAS and the High 
Representative as well as tweaking the organisational structure and working 
procedures of the different bits of the EU foreign policy machinery can have a positive 
effect in improving the effectiveness of the EU’s external action.  
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ANNEX 1. CHAIRMANSHIP AND COMMISSION 
ATTENDANCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL 
PREPARATORY WORKING GROUPS 
Working Group Chair Lead Commission 
DG before 1.01.2011 
Lead Commission 
DG from 1.01.2011 
Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) 
EEAS RELEX Commission SG 
Geographic WGs 
Mashreq/Maghreb (MAMA) EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(COEST) 
EEAS RELEX  TRADE 
Western Balkans (COWEB) EEAS ELARG ELARG 
Middle East / Gulf 
(COMEM/MOG) 
EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Asia-Oceanic (COASI) EEAS RELEX TRADE 
Latin America (COLAT) EEAS RELEX TRADE 
Transatlantic Relations (COTRA) EEAS RELEX TRADE 
Africa (COAFR) EEAS DEV DEVCO 
Horizontal WGs 
RELEX Counsellors Rotating 
Presidency 
RELEX FPI 
Nicolaidis EEAS RELEX Commission SG 
Global Disarmament and Arms 
control (CODUN) 
EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Non-proliferation (CONOP) EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Conventional arms exports 
(COARM) 
EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Human rights (COHOM)  EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Middle East Peace Process 
(COMEP) 
EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Terrorism - international aspects 
COTER) 
Rotating 
Presidency 
RELEX HOME 
Application of specific measures 
to combat terrorism (COCOP) 
Rotating 
Presidency 
RELEX HOME 
OSCE and Council of Europe 
(COSCE) 
EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
United Nations (CONUN) EEAS RELEX DEVCO 
Public international law 
(COJUR) 
Rotating 
Presidency 
SJ SJ 
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Law of the Sea (COMAR) Rotating 
Presidency 
MARE MARE 
Consular affairs (COCON) Rotating 
Presidency 
JUST JUST 
CFSP Administrative affairs and 
protocol (COADM) 
Rotating 
Presidency 
RELEX Commission’s 
Nicolaidis 
representative 
CSDP-related WGs 
Military Committee (EUMC) EEAS RELEX ECHO 
Military Committee WG 
(EUMCWG) 
EEAS RELEX ECHO 
Politico-Military WG (PMG) EEAS RELEX ECHO 
Civilian aspects of crisis 
management (CIVCOM) 
EEAS RELEX FPIS 
European Arms Policy 
(dormant) 
EEAS RELEX ENTR 
Trade and development WGs 
Trade Policy Committee  Rotating 
Presidency 
TRADE TRADE 
Development Cooperation 
(DEVGEN) 
Rotating 
Presidency 
DEV DEVCO 
ACP Working Party Rotating 
Presidency 
DEV DEVCO 
EFTA Rotating 
Presidency 
RELEX TRADE  
Dual Use goods Rotating 
Presidency 
TRADE  TRADE  
Trade questions Rotating 
Presidency 
TRADE  TRADE  
Commodities Rotating 
Presidency 
DEV DEVCO 
Preparation for international 
development 
conferences/UNCCD 
desertification / UNCTAD 
Rotating 
Presidency 
DEV DEVCO 
Humanitarian aid and food aid Rotating 
Presidency 
ECHO and DEV ECHO 
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ANNEX 2. METHODOLOGY 
Interviews 
Between May 2011 and December 2012, 48 interviews were carried out with officials 
from the EEAS and the Commission as well as with representatives from the member 
states and the European Parliament. 
Statements by the High Representative 
HR/VP Catherine Ashton and her team introduced a hierarchical system of press 
releases, which separates statements from press conference remarks and other 
contributions, like speeches. Statements are labelled as ‘Statement by the High 
Representative’. Such statements, similar in wording and content, made by the 
previous High Representative Solana had different headings. In order to make the 
statements of Ashton and Solana comparable all ‘Statements’, ‘Comments’, 
‘Declarations’, ‘Congratulations’, ‘Condolences’, ‘Appeals’ or ‘Condemnations’ 
followed by a direct quote in italics where counted for Solana. Speeches, press 
conference remarks and nominations (except EUSRs) have not been counted for both 
actors. 
Sources: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/; http://eeas.europa.eu/. 
Council conclusions 
The Council conclusions have been counted between 2007 and 2011 on the basis of 
Council conclusions of the meetings of the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (pre-Lisbon) and the Foreign Affairs Council (post-Lisbon). Considered were 
items under the headings ‘Foreign Policy’, ‘Defence’ and ‘Development’. Conclusions 
on trade or enlargement were not counted, as these are still in the remit of the rotating 
Presidency after the Lisbon Treaty (either in the General Affairs Council or in the trade 
formation of the Foreign Affairs Council). 
Source: http://www.consilium.europa.eu. 
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Presence in the European Parliament 
The number of visits of high ranking members of the executive in the parliament was 
counted on the basis of minutes of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the plenary 
sessions. For the 2004-2009 legislature numbers provided by the activity report of the 
Committee of Foreign Affairs were used. 
Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu. 
Presence in Commission college meetings  
The presence of the HR/VP and the current commissioners in the meeting of the 
Commission college were determined on the base of the minutes of the meetings 
available on the European Commission webpage.  
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/pvOverview.cfm?CL=en 
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